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Abstract 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a beautiful but troubled state that seems to be unable to move 
on from its past. Political reform, stability and peace are not as sure as many like to think. The 
country has made great progress, working towards NATO membership and filing an official EU 
candidacy application. International actors, institutions and organisations seem to be its main 
obstabcles. Some argue the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is like a governor forcing 
policies and legislation. Others promote the positive influence of such organisations; guaranteeing 
peace, stability, implementation of the Dayton Accords and preventing eruption of new hostilities. 
In my research on BiH I found that two states, Russia and Turkey, exert considerable influence 
on the Bosniak and Serb segments of BiH. It is their actions and policy which have left me to 
question what their impact has been on the development of BiH. I have attempted to find and 
describe the “operational codes” for both actors by analysing official statements, public 
appearances, speeches by representatives of the governments and media reports. I used the theory 
concerning operation codes by George complemented by Holsti and others. I tried to answer five 
“philosophical” questions on how the actors perceive BiH and their influence on it, as well as five 
“instrumental” questions on how their policy goals are set and pursued. 
This has lad me to conclude that both actors believe to have considerable influence. Turkey uses 
a wide range of tools to exert influence, such as economic and political support. Organising 
diplomatic meetings between different ethnic groups. It utilises its shared Ottoman heritage and 
history and its position in international organisations such as NATO. Along its wide range of tools it 
sets multiple goals with several sub-objectives and seizes opportunities to pursue them. Turkey 
invests in reconstruction of Muslim monuments and in educational facilities. It believes BiH is 
peaceful, but conflict is possible by misinterpretations of events by different ethnic groups. Turkey 
has been criticised for its focus on Muslim communities and projects.  
Russia uses more limited means to exert its influence, namely its international influence, its 
common Slavic heritage and political and limited financial support. By safely testing the waters it 
progresses slowly towards limited goals with few sub-objectives. It only seizes the opportunities in 
which its limited means can be used. For instance Russia didn’t support the Republika Srpska the 
first time it asked for a loan. And it didn’t make any deals with Serbia for military equipment 
against reduced prices. Only after a second attempted and when it noticed little resistance from the 
international community Russia gave such support. Finally I apply the discovered operational codes 
to BiH’s timeline and we can observe the influence of both states.  
Word of Thanks 
First and foremost I would like to thank my parents, sister and brother in law for sticking with 
me during all these odd years in which I have changed paths so very often. It can’t have been easy 
to support every single whim and idea, but here we are. 
Secondly I would like to especially thank Monika and Paul for supporting, guiding and pushing 
me to pursue my dreams and develop my talents. They taught me to think in possibilities, believe in 
my own abilities and talents rather than letting my insecurity have the better of me. 
Thirdly a special thanks to Professor Doctor Ingenieur Voorhoeve and Vasileios Karakasis who 
have inspired me and supported this thesis. They have donated countless hours and feedback for 
which I will be forever grateful.  
Furthermore I would like to thank Lucia Overspelt, Kathinka Gaess and Leila Cornips for their 
support and sociability during all our lectures, paper writings and tests. It was an honour and great 
fun to work together and to have enjoyed your friendship. 
Lastly I would like to thank all friends, family and professionals, including those who wish to 
remain anonymous, for their support, time, feedback, interests, dedication and believe in my ability 
to achieve this thesis. 
Declaration of own work 
I hereby declare this work to be that of my own, produced without the help of any professional 
institutes or organisations. All work not my own, either paraphrased, quoted or in any other form, 
has been clearly referenced in a constant and appropriate way. A list has been provided with all the 
sources used for either written works, photographs or other data used in this thesis. I have correctly 
mentioned when I have received help in any form from professionals, experts or anyone else. This 
thesis, with the title Russia, Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovian, a study of operational codes which 
may harm peacebuilding, has been written and submitted to obtain the Master Degree in Public 
Administration, International and European governance at the University of Leiden, the 
Netherlands. It has been supervised by Prof. Dr. Ir. Voorhoeve. 
31st of May 2017 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. Social and academic relevance 2 
A readers guide 4 
2. Bosnia’s rich history and troubling present 5 
Towards the First World War and thereafter 5 
The Second World War 6 
Communism in BiH 6 
Setting the stage for war 7 
The tragedy of BiH 8 
Dayton and onward 9 
The ‘Statehood day of RS’ referendum 10 
3. Problem definition and research question 12 
4. Literature Review 14 
5. Methodology 21 
Type of study and unit of analysis 21 
Context of time 22 
Reliability and validity 22 
Hypotheses 23 
6. Data analysis 28 
Turkey 28 
'Weltanschauung' questions 28 
Instrumental questions 37 
Russia 41 
'Weltanschauung' questions 41 
Instrumental questions 49 
7. Discussion 53 
Limitations 57 
8. A few last questions 59 
Is secession by the RS likely?  59 
Is renewed armed conflict within BiH likely?  60 
Have there been actions for reconciliation?  61 
What may we possibly learn from BiH for new conflict resolutions and peace building strategies in the 
future?  62 
9. References  64
1. Social and academic relevance 
The war in Syria has left many internally displaced, fleeing to other countries and numerous 
dead. This is a direct result of the internal struggle for power and the inability of the international 
community to act unilaterally. Melander, Öberg and Hall argued that the new wars, those following 
the end of the cold war, are not more atrocious. They go on to state that the absence of power play 
by international actors, “the decline of ideological conflict” and “the restraining influence of 
increasingly globalised economies on governments” (Melander, Öberg & Hall, 2009, pp. 508) are at 
the root of this decline of deaths, wounded and displaced civilians (2009). When looking for 
solutions for, and to understand the current state of affairs of these fragile countries’ aspiring liberal 
democracy, journalists and diplomats look at the past for answers. Here, special interest is given to 
the Dayton Accord, which was a deal in one of the most violent ethnic wars in recent history. This 
leads us to question: could it be a blueprint for peace in Syria? 
Before the Dayton Accord can be used as a blueprint, lessons should be learned from and a 
review should be made of the current state of affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Here we 
should ask ourselves where the Dayton Accord have led this ethnic divided country? Leroux - 
Martin discusses in his New York Times article of 2014 a few lessons to be learned from BiH in 
order to resolve the conflict in Syria. A couple of these are 1) that a peace agreement will not be 
achievable without all the actors at the negotiation table. Including all neighbouring states and those 
involved in implementing and enforcing a possible agreement. 2) War does not end at the peace 
agreement and with the absence of violence. BiH shows us that ethnic and religious conflicts can 
continue to fester amongst the population. The aspirations of the elite are continued within the 
political sphere (2014). The latter may be better than physical conflict, but the current state of BiH 
shows us that the pursuit of wartime aspirations through politics can be as destructive to a nation as 
conflict itself. 
Reccurrence of violence may be unlikely within BiH, the grim state of the fragile country should 
worry the international community. Its population has simply lost faith in its government; the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung reported in 2016 that only 16% of the population approved of its government. 
Parties are known to shift attention from social problems concerning health care, education and 
unemployment towards ethnic issues sparking unrest within the country. Since 2006 the 
international community has tried to make the political elite more responsible for the governance of 
BiH by reducing the influence of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). A reduction of 
influence by the OHR, among other actions, have not proven to move the political elite and the 
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population towards responsibility and constitutional reform. The stagnation of EU enlargement 
policy has left BiH and other Balkan countries vulnerable to geopolitics. BiH is a case in point 
which shows that commitment by international actors to peacebuilding over a long period of time is 
of great importance. The current state of affairs within BiH calls for renewed attention by the 
international community. It should support efforts that will facilitate reform to move the country 
forward from its current deadlock. 
The recent elections and the referendum of the Republika Srpska (RS) on Statehood day, have 
caused violence to return. With an annual average income of € 7.950,48 in 2016, an unemployment 
rate of 41,93%, the country is economically weak (Trading Economics, 2017 & World Bank, 2013). 
Politically the situation is even more unstable, with parties threatening with secession and violence 
to gain more votes and international support. In BiH 600 international troops are deployed to 
guarantee that the provisions of the Dayton Accord are implemented. The safety, security and 
authority of these troops have been challenged by the RS president. Each ethnic group promotes its 
own version of history creating more resentment and instability. There is no political solidarity 
across the three ethnic groups and no feeling of shared history. 
To understand why actors make certain decisions and how events can evolve the way they do it 
is important to understand their beliefs system, identified by Leites and George as the operational 
code. In his article of 1976 Holsti mentions that the ‘(R)esearch on foreign policy leaders and their 
beliefs, perceptions, styles of information-processing, strategies for coping with uncertainty, and the 
like have been a secondary area of concern’ (pp. 13). He goes on to argue that often the belief 
systems of foreign policy-makers is left as the unexplained variable after all other factors are 
identified. While the role of these beliefs and perception filters are accepted as an influence on 
decision makers of foreign, research that incorporates it is rare (Holsti, 1976). Holsti goes on to 
state that ‘the proposition is that for some decisions a cognitive process perspective is fundamental 
and should be at the starting point of the analysis’ (Holsti, 1976, pp. 21). In this argument he is not 
alone. George argues that operational codes can create a better understanding of how actors 
interpret situations and act. He accepts that beliefs are not the only influence on the actors. They can 
help us understand and analyse the flow of political events and the influence of certain actors. 
George’s article from 1969 aimed to simplify Leites work, which was considered as a great insight 
into the Bolshevik mind. It was also believed to have the ability to fill some of the shortcomings of 
most theories by focussing on the behaviour of political leadership. He goes on to formulate five 
philosophical and five instrumental questions which will help to establish a clear image of the belief 
system of a political actor (George, 1969). His theory has been used since to study different political 
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actors and their system of beliefs. However, over time studies turned this model into mathematical 
equations to either calculate changes in the operational code of a political actor over time, or 
compare different cases with each other. It is my understanding that the aim of both Leite’s and 
George’s early work was to help students understand the complex system of beliefs that influence a 
political actor. By using these theories, this study returns to the ten questions asked by George, to 
better understand how certain political actors have had an impact on the current situation of BiH. 
To fully understand what is unfolding we need to look both at history and at the current current 
situation. The history of BiH will help us to understand where grievances between the main 
ethnicities, Croat, Bosniak and Serb, come from and to which international actors they feel attracted 
when seeking alliances. A short analysis of the current state of affairs will show us why the 
international community should renew its commitment to this highly unstable state of BiH. It 
should not rely on hope that time and financial aid will solve BiH’s current problems. It will also 
give ideas to what aspects of the Dayton Accords should be reviewed before it can serve as a 
blueprint for peace agreements elsewhere. 
A readers guide 
The following chapter will discuss the historical and current development of BiH to help the 
reader better understand the complicated situation of the country and its region. Followed by a 
description of the problem and considerations for the research, this third chapter will also discuss 
the research question. The fourth chapter will discuss the theoretical framework which will be 
applied to deepen the understanding of the development of BiH over time and to establish the 
operational code for the units of analysis. The fifth chapter will move on to elaborate on how the 
research is set up, explain the choice for the units of analysis, discuss the time constraint and the 
reliability and validity. It defines how the data will be organised for each question and what kind of 
indicators can be used. The sixth chapter will provide an analysis of the data per case and per 
question, as formulated by George. The seventh chapter will comprise a full picture of the 
operational codes of each unit of analysis followed by a discussion of how it has influenced the 
situation in BiH. The final chapter will try to answer more general questions which have arisen 
during the reach based on the found data and the analysis of the historical and current situation.  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2. Bosnia’s rich history and troubling present 
‘Those who cannot remember the past, are doomed to repeat it’ or even better put ‘(T)hose who 
do not learn from the past, are doomed to repeat it’ (George Santayana). BiH's current problems are 
not only the result of the war in the 90’s, a rich history with grievances proceeds it. Therefore the 
current state of affairs and the influence of international actors on the different ethnic groups in BiH 
can not be understood without a general understanding of its history. 
In the early ages of the Balkans the area was dominated by two religions, the Catholics and the 
Slavic Orthodox. Over time the Ottoman empire also gained significant influence in the region and 
especially within BiH. Depending on the outcome of wars between the Habsburg and Ottoman 
empires the official faith of specific regions changed. Governments of either empire would send 
settlers to these areas to populate and convert locals. Between these battling powers the Orthodox 
leaders in the Monastery of Peć were able to establish an autonomous state for the Orthodox 
Community and created a Serbian Nationality. Under Ottoman governance the Muslim population 
enjoyed economic, social and judicial advantages. Other faiths secured certain autonomy and 
freedoms but within the boundaries of their own faith and the general social structure of the 
Ottoman empire. In the countryside communities lived in groups separated by ethnicity and faith. 
The landowners were often Muslim with either Catholic, Slavic Orthodox or other Muslims as 
serfs. Each community had its own village, church and educational system. Even-though people 
living in larger cities were separated into quarters for each community, life was more multi-cultural, 
multi-religious and multi-ethnic as peoples from all backgrounds worked and lived close together 
(Bennett, 2016 & van den Heuvel 1993). 
Towards the First World War and thereafter 
With help of the Russians the Bulgarians put an end to the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The San 
Stefano treaty left BiH autonomous with a parliament. After the Congress of Berlin BiH was 
absolved within the Habsburg empire, with the territory belonging to Austria - Hungary but the 
judicial system and social order of the Ottoman empire. Over time the foreign civil servants within 
BiH were replaced by mainly Croats, whom worked together with the Muslim population for more 
autonomy. The Serbs aimed to become part of the independent Serbian Nation. In the countryside, 
the administration left the Muslim elite in power in return for their loyalty. This caused resentment 
amongst the Serbian population. After the First World War the Habsburg empire disintegrated 
rapidly, to which the political elite of BiH responded by joining the Yugoslav Empire under King 
Alexander. The Kingdom was dominated by Serbs, with the first cabinet existing of 13 Serbs, 4 
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Croats and 2 Slovenes members and only 1 Muslim member. Serfdom was abolished and the power 
of the Muslim landowners moved towards the Serbs. Their land was given to the peasants without 
compensation. Muslims soon found themselves underrepresented and dependent on a dominant 
Serb administration, this imbalance caused many violent responses in the streets, especially in BiH. 
After a shooting in parliament King Alexander established a royal dictatorship, dividing the 
countries along territorial lines instead of ethnic. The King was assassinated in 1934 making his 
nephew, Prince Paul, Prince Regent. The Prince Regent maintained the royal dictatorship but 
listened to the people in search for stability. Such stability was unachievable between the Serbs, 
Muslims and Slovenes, forcing him to turn to the Croats. In return for their support they demanded 
more autonomy in a territory that would be dominated by Croats. In line with this plan the Serbs 
and Slovenes would also gain more autonomous territories but with the coming of the Second 
World War this was never realised (Bennett, 2016 & van den Heuvel 1993). 
The Second World War 
Hitler had no direct interest in Yugoslavia, but after a coup d’etat, in response to the agreement 
of the Prince Regent to let Hitler transport supplies through the country towards Greece, he gave 
away as many territories to those who laid claim to them. Hitler was left with Serbia, Croatia, BiH 
and Vojvodina. Within Serbia a pro-German leadership was soon found. In the other territories there 
was little German support, forcing Hitler to look at the terrorist party of Ustasas. The regime 
focussed mainly on the Serbs, killing one-third, ousting another and converting the remaining part 
to Catholicism. This policy gave power to the communist resistance, which leadership was multi-
ethnic but mainly Serb. Under Tito’s leadership the resistance grew and designed the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in which no ethnicity controlled any particular area (Bennett, 2016 
& van den Heuvel 1993).  
Communism in BiH 
After the Second World War the communist leadership started to eliminate opponents and 
promote their version of history. It was the start of the destabilisation between the different ethnic 
groups. BiH became one of the republics of Yugoslavia. Under Tito the Muslims became an ethnic 
group, however Tito did not promote ethnic diversity but a shared identity of workers. Within BiH 
interethnic marriages increased and daily life became mixed. The influence and credibility of the 
communist party depended heavily on the reputation of Tito. This resulted in a slow disintegration 
of the party after his death. The harsh economic condition cause by mismanagement of the party 
didn’t help either. The conditions opened up an opportunity for Milošević to gain influence in 
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Serbia. He used a more nationalistic approach appealing not only to the Serbs in Serbia but across 
all eight entities of Yugoslavia. The administration chose the path of least resistance and hoped for 
the support of the Western Powers with only the Slovenes standing up to Milošević’s aspirations for 
centralised power. Western powers had more interest in the emerging democracies following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia lost its role as an independent country in-between the 
West and the Communist world. While the communists lost its control, all parties involved agreed 
that division along ethnic lines would be the biggest threat to the peace. The new leadership brought 
economic stability but was unable to deliver political reform. It preferred a more liberal democratic 
system with federal multi party elections. For this system to have any success the republics would 
have to wait with their domestic elections. Slovenes, afraid of Serb nationalism, went ahead with 
their planned elections. Croatia followed and elected a Croatian representation which discriminated 
Serbs. These actions made national elections and a move to a more liberal democratic state 
impossible. In response BiH banned parties based on ethnicity. The policy was dismantled by the 
Yugoslav constitutional court and the elections were dominated by ethno-national parties. Voters 
within BiH, afraid of control by any ethnic group other than their own, voted along ethnic lines. 
This led to leadership which was divided on the basis of the three main ethnicities, Muslim (SDA), 
Serb (SDS) and Croat (HDZ). This leadership was unable to form a coalition, let alone reach any 
joint decisions (BBC, 2016, Bennett, 2016, Johnston & Eastvold, 2004 & van den Heuvel 1993).  
Setting the stage for war 
With politics getting more entrenched along the ethnic lines the Slovenes and Croats moved 
towards secession in fear of Milošević. In response Serbs started to rise up against the government 
of other republics and made declarations of independence, destabilising them. The international 
community was against the division of Yugoslavia along ethnic lines. This stance gave the 
impression they supported the Milošević regime. Even without international support the republics 
went ahead with their move towards independence (BBC, 2016, Bennett, 2016, Johnston & 
Eastvold, 2004, & van den Heuvel 1993). 
The European Community (EC) was able to broker a peace deal, called the Brioni Agreement, in 
1991. It should have guaranteed a smooth process for secession by Slovenia and Croatia. The 
biggest obstacle was how to define a nation: was it a territory and whoever lived in it, or was it an 
ethnic nationality of a people. The Serbs adopted the latter, claiming that everyone had a right to 
secede. The final proposal was the loosely bound grouping of states of Yugoslavia with republics 
which borders would be drawn along the existing territorial lines. Each republic and the central state 
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would respect the human rights of all peoples, even the minorities. The concept of the central state 
was vital to get Serbia to sign, however they rejected it at the last moment claiming it would turn 
Serbs into minorities within the other republics. In the end the EC had to admit that the former 
Yugoslavia was starting to disintegrate. The Badinter Commission, first charged with advising the 
EC during its peace negotiation, now established conditions which had to be met before republics 
could claim independence. It stated that the republics could be formed along the existing territorial 
lines and would have to grant all citizens, of all ethnicities, equal human rights and freedoms. Those 
petitioning for independence would be reviewed by the Badinter Commission before awarded their 
sovereign status. The process was a formality for Slovenia and Croatia. Kosovo was refused as it 
was not a republic but a province. BiH had to reform legislation on human rights and freedoms 
before it would be considered. Within BiH the self-proclaimed RS was afraid of reintegration within 
Croatia or BiH, in response it held a referendum and on the 9th of January 1992 proclaimed its 
independence. During the unrest Serbs, cooperating with the Yugoslav army, positioned themselves 
strategically within BiH. They provoked violence leading to the first Muslim and Croat refugees. 
Subsequently, and with memory of the atrocities during the petition of Croatia’s independence, the 
Croats formed a community in the west of Herzegovina with their own governing structure (BBC, 
2016, Bennett, 2016 & Borger 2015). 
The tragedy of BiH 
In an attempt to retain the republic the Badinter Commission advised BiH to hold a referendum 
to poll the support for independence. However, the referendum was held without a clear idea of 
what the state structure should look like. Support for independence was high, but violence and war 
broke as no consensus could be reached between the three main ethnic groups over the state 
structure. The Muslims and Croats formed a coalition against the Serbs. This disintegrated when 
Croatians made clear it wanted to claim territory and join Croatia. Serbs held on to the idea that a 
nation was defined by its ethnic heritage. Other parties held the belief a nation was defined by its 
territorial borders. Following the first definition groups started ethnic cleansing and grave atrocities 
were committed by all sides. The goals of the strategy was to give ethnic communities incentives to 
flee so territories would be dominated by a particular ethnic group. The International Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) was formed to reach a peace agreement, its first proposal was the 
Vance-Owen plan. The plan would respect the ethnic heritage, but no territories would be 
established where one ethnicity would be dominant. It also stated that any territories claimed during 
the atrocities would not be internationally recognised. The Vance-Owen plan failed as the Serbs felt 
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it did not recognise their claims to territories. On the other hand the US claimed it would recognise 
the ethnic cleansing, which had resulted in an unfair distribution of ethnic population and territory, 
and would discriminate against the Muslims. The failure of the plan was the final death pin to the 
Croat-Muslim alliance as it became clear to all parties it was every man for himself. It wasn’t until 
humanitarian aid and the work of UNPROFOR was made impossible that the international 
community committed to resolving the crisis. The US urged the Muslims to reestablish the alliance 
with Croatia and together with a reinforced UNPROFOR it pushed back the Serbs. When the 51-49 
percent split, in favour of the federation, was reached the US urged the alliance to halt and start 
negotiating peace. This was due to fear for involvement of Serbia and another break up in the 
alliance. The negotiations took place at the Dayton Airbase between Tuđman, representing the 
Croats, Izetbegović, representing the Muslim Bosnians (Bosniaks), and Milošević, representing the 
Serbs. Milošević was eager to accept terms to lift the sanctions placed on Serbia, conditions the 
Bosnian Serb leadership would probably not have accepted. On the other hand Izetbegović felt 
bullied into an unjust peace (BBC, 2016, Bennett, 2016 & Borger 2015). 
Dayton and onward 
The Dayton Accords were signed on the 14th of December 1995 in Paris, putting the three main 
ethnicities, Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, in power. The Accords were detailed and brokered a peace 
deal where others had failed. A flaw of in it is the framework which prevents reforms and, at 
implementation, lacked a clear road towards democracy. Citizenship, and all it rights, is only 
granted to those who identify themselves as one of the three main ethnicities of the country, 
discriminating all other minorities. Furthermore it made BiH, in its early days, dependent on the 
international organisations guaranteeing the Accords, amongst which NATO, OSCE and UNHCR. 
The Accords also left the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) rather powerless, as 
those signatory to it were also the main orchestrators of atrocities. With the Accords organised 
behind closed doors, the ICTY unequipped to prosecute the main offenders and small war time 
criminals walking around freely, a fragile country tried to make a new start (Hronesova, 2015). 
The political design for BiH laid down in the Dayton Accords has essentially created a 
constitutional monster. The country exists of two entities, the Federation, mainly Bosniak and 
Croat, and the RS, mainly Serb, and the district of Brcko being independent of either. These are 
bound loosely by the central government of BiH in Sarajevo. The entities have significant 
autonomy and the central government has a rotating presidency. Political parties are ethnically 
based and candidates for elections can only come from the three main ethnic groups. Each candidate 
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can only represent one ethnicity, making multi-ethnic parties impossible. BiH has a House of 
Representatives existing of 42 directly elected members (28 Federation and 14 RS) and a House of 
the Peoples with 15 members elected by the entities parliament (5 Bosniak, 5 Croat and 5 Serb). 
Each entity has its own prime minister and up to 16 ministries. The Federation has a 98 directly 
elected member House of Representatives and the RS a 83 member national assembly. The 
Federation breaks further down into 10 cantons with autonomy on subjects such as healthcare and 
education with each their own ministries (Nardelli, Dzidic and Jukic, 2014). 
Moving in to the 00’s BiH started to become a dysfunctional state with the Federation not only 
worrying about a rebellious RS but also dealing with dissatisfaction of Croats within its own entity 
(Morrison, 2010 & Traynor, 2011). The Office of the High Representative (OHR) was given 
extended powers during the early days of the new century as its work was opposed by domestic 
politicians. From 2006 onward the influence of the OHR was reduced to create space for institutions 
to mature and give the people a chance to hold their political representation accountable for their 
actions. With a withdrawing OHR the president of the RS, Dodik, saw his opportunity to disrupt 
and defy the central government and moved towards referenda with a secessionist character 
(Delaney, 2016). In 2011 this deliberate disruption and opposing of the central government and 
international powers within BiH took on concrete action. The RS refused postal stamps from 
Sarajevo, it swapped trains and prevented the building of a motorway between Sarajevo and Banja 
Luka (Vulliamy, 2011). The EU and US started the Butmir process in 2010 to align these quarreling 
ethnic groups and move political reform forward. The process was met with heavy resistance and 
the inability to agree on even the smallest points (Morrison, 2010).  
Onward from 2010 Dodik started to defy Western Powers and the centralised state. He feels 
strengthened by Russia in his desire for secession, while Russia’s interest may merely be to get back 
at the EU. With his claims for secession and focussing on ethnic conflicts Dodik is able to gain 
more votes and move attention away from pressing matters such as social reform, healthcare and 
education (The Economist, 2016 & MacLauglin, 2016). After the elections in 2016 Dodiks party 
gained many municipalities increasing his strength, constraining freedom of media and passing laws 
against demonstrations and freedom within cyber space (Mujanovic, 2016). This worrisome picture 
should set off alarm bells within the EU and US, concrete action, however, is absent.  
The ‘Statehood day of RS’ referendum 
The referendum in the RS has a leading role in the current unfolding of the state of affairs in, and 
the international involvement with BiH. It took place on the 25th of September in 2016 and asked 
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its Serb population if the national holiday should remain on the 9th of January (Geraedts, 2016). 
The national holiday was found to be discriminatory to the other two ethnic groups by the 
constitutional court. With the referendum Dodik challenged the court, which he claims is 
discriminatory towards Serbs and not acting along the lines set out by the Dayton Accords (Rose, 
2016). The atmosphere started to heat up when Bosniak politicians responded with statements that 
resounded violence. They argued that the RS existence is guaranteed by the Dayton Accords and a 
possible secession would break it up and would not go down well with the Federation. Vučić was 
urged by the international community not to get involved. However, he responded to the statements 
of the Federation that ‘Serbia “respects BiH’ integrity” but will “not allow RS to be 
destroyed”’ (Knezevic, 2016). Dodik responded, feeling the support of Russia and Serbia, that if a 
force would march on the RS it would declare its independence and defend itself (McaLaughlin, 
2016).  
55.8% of those eligible to vote in the referendum turned up and voted with 99.8% in favour of 
having the holiday to remain on the 9th of January (The Economist, 2016). The inability of the 
OHR and the international community to prevent the referendum from taking place shows how 
Dodik is able to defy and challenge the international community. He goes on to be unwilling to pay 
up on his loans or, as a compromise, implement reform of the government system. Dodiks wartime 
and secessionist rhetorics may protect him for another election but the dire state of the RS and BiH 
will catch up with him at some point. The question is, however, if the international community can 
and should wait until such times arrive (Europp, Mujanovic, 2016).  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3. Problem definition and research question 
In the heavy snowstorm of 2012 the roof of Skenderij, one of Sarajevo’s most important 
commercial centres, caved in under the amount of snow build up on the roof, crushing cars, offices 
and shops. The cause was evident, no one had taken the time to clear the roof until it was too late. In 
BiH the issue was highly politicised and instead of setting up regulations, ethnic oriented parties 
blamed each other, but even more so, the war (Borger, 2012). The current state seems dysfunctional 
and unable to let go of its past. An analysis of BiH’s history and the period after the war has shown 
us that many actors and events have had an impact on the development and design of the state. The 
diminishing interest and fatigue of the EU in its enlargement policy and the increasing conditions 
that need to be met before filing for candidacy make it hard for countries to work towards EU 
accession (Marini, 2012). With the change of power in the US to a more pro-Putin leader, who's 
governments plans are to put national interest before getting mixed up in international issues, 
another important international influence is leaving the region (The Economist, 2016). Voorhoeve 
mentions the dangers of a power vacuum, creating opportunities for warlords and other political 
leaders who do not hold the people’s best interest in mind to seize power (2007). BiH may not have 
to fear warlords, but the ethno-national oriented parties seem to focus more on ethnically charged 
issues than the necessary social and political reform. It is the goal of this research to look into two 
actors whom have had an impact in the recent development of BiH, Russia and Turkey. With Dodik, 
and the RS, striving towards secession and his constant defiance and increasing harsh rhetorics 
towards the West, Putin has found an interesting ally within the Balkans. The region is of interest to 
Russia and especially Putin for different reasons. First of all Russia controls over 90% of the gas 
and energy market in several Balkan states. Secondly the regime uses the failure and influence of 
the West in the region to strengthen its image of victimisation. After the last war in the region Putin 
had the ability to heal the wounds and, as his predecessor Yeltsin, balance between supporting their 
Orthodox and Slavic brothers and sisters and staying on good terms with the West. Putin, however, 
choose not to do so, creating an image of Serbs and Russians being victims of the Western powers. 
With Russia throwing its weight around in the Crimea, it is using the Balkan to increase its 
legitimacy at home. Putin uses the Balkan, and especially its influence in BiH, to bring serious 
damage to the image and influence of the EU, NATO and the USA in the region, delaying potential 
EU and NATO enlargement (LSEE Research on South Eastern Europe & SEESOX South East 
European Studies at Oxford, 2015). 
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The second actor which will be reviewed in this research is Turkey. It has always viewed the 
Balkans as the road towards the West, both literally as figuratively, however its interest is much 
more than that. First of all Turkey and the Balkans have a common history, within its foreign policy 
Turkey states that it feels obliged to support its Muslim brothers and sisters. Secondly many Turks 
come from the Balkan region, pressurising the government to take a special interest in the ongoing 
affairs of the region. This also helps to explain why Turkey was one of the first to support the 
Bosniaks in the war of the early 90’s. On the other hand, approximately one million Turks live 
within the Balkan region. These groups with Balkan relations are the least supportive of the APK 
government, forcing the government to show interest in the region to gain domestic legitimacy. 
Thirdly the region is of economic interest, with investments, import and export figures rapidly 
increasing in recent years. The aftermath of the Arab spring and the ongoing conflict in Syria is 
threatening Turkeys economic stability and influence in the international community, increasing the 
importance of peace and stability in the Balkans. Lastly the region, and especially BiH, played an 
important role for Turkey in its bid for EU candidacy. It felt attracted to the region as they also 
worked towards candidacy. However, Turkeys interest in the EU has diminished but its interest in 
the Balkans and BiH has not. To strengthen its position within NATO and its relationship with the 
USA, its role in the region can be of great influence for achieving such goals (Türbedar, 2011). 
The influence and interests of both countries has had an impact on the stance of the Bosniaks and 
the Serbs on issues concerning reform within the political system and the bid for secession by the 
RS. It is therefore important to further examine how the foreign policies of these two actors have 
influenced BiHs development. I am fully aware that these two actors are not the only influential 
actors in the region. As has been discussed in the analysis and within this chapter the OHR, EU, 
USA, NATO, OSCE, neighbouring countries, history, and many others play an important role in the 
development and current behaviour of both BiH citizens and its political elite. It is, however, 
impossible to examine and analyse all actors and events for this master thesis. Simplification of a 
situation makes it possible to examine certain relationships extensively and grasp a better 
understanding of them (George, 1969 & Walker, 1990). Therefore the research question for this 
study will be: 
How have the foreign policy strategies of Russia and Turkey been able to influence the 
development of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards a possible secession of, and referendum on the 
statehood day by the Republika Srpska.  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4. Literature Review 
In 1951 Nathan Leites published an extensive and very detailed article called “The Operational 
Code of the Politburo”, followed by “A Study of Bolshevism” in 1953. These two studies are the 
basis for a model called the “Operational Code”. The goal of Leites’ research was to understand 
how the Bolshevik beliefs system worked in order to predict their moves. And to better understand 
why they behaved in a certain way in particular circumstances. Leites’ work was a great 
contribution to political science and of great relevance to the political climate of the day. The U.S. 
Department of State adopted the work which is still considered ground breaking and of great 
relevance. Alexander George, however, felt that Leites’ work was so detailed that it was difficult to 
recreate and reapply the theory to other cases. George distilled what he found to be the basic theory 
of Leites’ work which could be better applied to different case studies (1969). 
The “Operational Code”, according to George, is a set of beliefs that influences the way an actor 
analyses and perceives a political situation, especially in conflict situations. This system of beliefs 
forms a set of spectacles through which the actor observes a flow of political events and influences 
his observations and interpretations. The beliefs furthermore form the norms, standards and 
guidelines by which the actor makes decisions concerning political events (George, 1969). In my 
consideration an “Operational Code” should be seen as a set of conditions which an actor obliges 
himself to meet before making a decision. An actors belief system is comprised of more, namely his 
norms, values, culture, history and experiences. This belief system influences and forms the 
operational code. I believe the belief system relates to the identity of an actor while the operational 
code relates to the actor but also the institution in which he functions. A operational code is thus a 
chart on which the direction is influenced by the belief systems of the actor and the institutions in 
which he functions. 
George goes on to argue that it is of importance to understand how actors view each other and 
the flow of events in the international community to grasp how the relationships among them are 
formed. ‘(M)any scientifically-oriented scholars … have been struck by the role that the subjective 
perceptions and beliefs of leaders play in their decision-making in conflict situations’ (George, 
1969, pp. 191). Holsti went on to argue that political actors are not different from other actors. Their 
beliefs or “cognitive maps” help us to understand how actors interpret, receive and make sense of 
the situation at hand (Holsti, 1967). 
Holsti identifies several situations in which this kind of research might be fruitful and of 
importance. He argues that ‘(i)t has been noted, however, that “structural uncertainty” often 
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characterises important foreign policy choice situations… To the extent that this is more frequently 
the case in international than in domestic situations, we might expect that cognitive approaches 
would more often be applicable in issues of the former type’ (Holsti, 1976, pp. 18). An example, in 
which this kind of an analysis can be of great interest, are uncommon situations of major 
international importance, such as war and interventions. In these situations, standard procedures and 
common policy strategies may not be applicable and political actors have to move beyond them, 
often within limited time to reach decisions (Holsti, 1976). 
George breaks the operational code up in two types of belief, the first one being the instrumental 
beliefs, the second the philosophical beliefs. ‘A political leader’s beliefs about the nature of politics 
and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be 
shaped, and his notation of correct strategy and tactics are among the factors influencing that actor’s 
decisions.’ (George, 1969, pp. 197). In such situations pure rational choice constrains political 
leaders because the actor does not know everything about the situation. He cannot oversee all the 
consequences of the courses of action, and is often unable to formulate criteria that help to judge 
which course of action is best. Limited by these constraints, political leaders often have to adapt to 
the situation and its boundaries. The way a political leader deals with these boundaries are referred 
to by George as ‘instrumental beliefs,’ which he defines as ‘beliefs about ends-means relationships 
in the context of political action’ (1969, pp. 199). While the philosophical beliefs are identified as 
the other ‘set of more general issues and question that are part of the operational code’ (1969, pp. 
199). Defining it as the “assumptions and premises he makes regarding the fundamental nature of 
politics, the nature of political conflict, the role of the individual in history, etc” (1969, pp. 199). 
The latter give us an idea of how the actor perceives the world and what role he has given himself 
within it. The instrumental beliefs in contrast are more concerned with the concrete actions of 
pursuing these goals (George, 1969).  
We have to consider that the term philosophical has many definitions. In my belief it refers in 
this context to the way an actor views the world and his position in it. This view, or idea of position 
in the world is formed by the interpretations of events, irrespectively of whether these are right or 
wrong. This is highly influenced by the religious, cultural and social background of the actor. But 
also the personal, territorial and ethnic history. Philosophical, in my belief, refers to general life 
questions, a more wider set of beliefs held. The field of philosophy concerns itself with finding 
solutions for problems concerned with existence, knowledge, language and reason. It is also 
concerned with reflection on what has been in a more general sense and how this may be improved. 
Therefore I choose to refer to the philosophical questions of George as 'Weltanschauung' questions. 
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The word 'Weltanschauung' is of German origin but compromises much better what I have 
described as a definition than would, for instance, worldview. The latter refers to how a person can 
observe the world without considering its own place in it. So to speak the person would only be 
looking at the horizon, without looking sideways and backwards. Where as 'Weltanschauung' refers 
to how a person positions himself within the world, relates to it and perceives the phenomenon of 
life. It also includes the personal history, beliefs and experiences of the person. 
A study of the belief systems can not establish a clear relationship with the direct actions of the 
political actor. The belief systems work more subtle, or as Holsti states ‘they are one of several 
clusters of intervening variables that may shape and constrain decision-making behaviour’ (Holsti, 
1976, pp. 20). It is important to discover belief systems of certain actors because ‘(i)t is an 
undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself in the right in the thesis that the world is his 
enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct, he is 
bound eventually to be right’ (“X” (Kennan), 1947, pp 569). To discover what the beliefs of a 
political actor are George starts with the 'Weltanschauung' questions: 
1. How does the actor perceive his opponents in the international community? George argues 
the actor can perceive the political sphere in which he moves in different ways (1969). Holsti 
defined this question further by asking; is the world, according to the actor, in conflict and 
temporarily interrupted by peace or at peace and temporarily interrupted by conflict? Moving 
on to question what the actor beliefs to be the source of conflict. Based on these question he 
provides us with the following scheme (Walker, 1990, pp. 408): 
2. Is the actor optimistic or pessimistic about his ability to achieve his goals? George refers to 
the Bolshevik beliefs, who were optimistic that the capitalistic world would fall and 
communism would prevail, meanwhile being aware of the possible catastrophe that could fall 
upon them. Decisions and actions that could contribute to the such a catastrophe should be 
avoided by careful calculations. He states that the Bolsheviks were both optimistic and 
pessimistic (1969). 
What is the fundamental nature of the political universe?
Harmonious (conflict is temporary) Conflictual (conflict is permanent)
What are the fundamental 
sources of conflict?
Human nature A D
Attributes of nations B E
International system C F
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3. Does the actor believe the flow of political events is deterministic or indeterministic, and 
how much influence does the actor believe to have to change the direction? The Bolsheviks 
were deterministic in the sense that they held the change towards communism to be inevitable. 
However, the path towards it was indeterministic as different opportunities would cause 
different outcomes. The deterministic actor is more passive. Were as the indeterministic actor is 
active and believe in a constant changing road towards the outcome. The latter in turn, may 
very well change along the way (George, 1969). The actor can look at history and build on 
experiences to predict what may happen in the flow of events and the behaviour of his 
opponents. More plainly, we look at the actor whether he believes the outcome to be certain or 
uncertain. Whether many roads or a single road can lead to it. And if he seizes and creates 
opportunities or passively awaits the flow of events. 
4. Does the actor believe to have influence, and how much, over the direction of the course of 
action? The Bolsheviks believed they had to seize every possibility to advance in their 
endeavours and therefore had great influence on the course of action. However, every action 
should be carefully calculated as to avoid catastrophe (George, 1969). We thus have to 
determine if the actor believes to be able to change the direction of the course of action. And 
how much influence he believes to be able to wield. 
5. Does the actor believe in chance or in interconnectedness even where there is none? For 
instance the Bolsheviks did not believe in chance and thought every action was carefully 
planned. This highly influenced their perception of situations and their beliefs. Furthermore 
they did not believe in ‘muddling through’. As for risk of a catastrophe, there were right and 
wrong decisions and none in between (George, 1969). Here we have to question if the actor 
allows for accidents to shape the flow of events or whether every single action has been 
orchestrated and planned. 
With the answers to the 'Weltanschauung' questions in hand the researcher can move on to the 
instrumental questions (1969). To determine the instrumental beliefs of a political actor George, 
again, asks five questions: 
1. How are goals set and selected for political action? George looks at two different strategies 
when answering this question. The first is the Optimising Strategy, having multiple goals, with 
sub objectives in order to have different levels of achievability and payoff. The second, 
Adventures, which has multiple goals with no lesser objectives and only maximum payoff. In 
choosing the goals and objectives the constraints of rational choice play a role. The way the 
actor perceives his opponents in the international community influences setting goals and 
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objectives. The actor may ask himself whether it is important that his goals do not trigger 
reactions, for instance physical mobilisation, from his opponents. The perception of the strength 
of the opponent is an important factor in the judgement of the actor. For instance the Bolsheviks 
believed that it was impossible to be all knowing, the outcomes are uncertain and unpredictable. 
Therefore they deployed a careful strategy setting a range of different goals and objectives 
which combined would give maximum payoff. However, each goal and objective could also be 
achieved independently and would still have a payoff. It was of great importance to carefully 
calculate the strength of the opponent and the likelihood of it being deployed before they 
pursued a specific goal. The Bolshevik strategy was thus ‘an optimising strategy that pursues 
graduated objectives, but “avoid adventures”’ (George, 1969, pp. 209). So part of the strategy is 
the ‘calculation, control, and acceptance of risk’ (George, 1969, pp. 209) or the absence of it. 
2. How does the actor pursue his goals? Does he deploy an aggressive strategy and ignore the 
strength of his opponents and acts, even when it is not in his best interest. Or does he pursue a 
more passive strategy in which he takes the strength of his opponents in consideration, pressing 
forward when opportunity arrises and retreating when strong opponents take on a more 
aggressive stance. The Bolshevik answer to the question was to “push to the limit”, “engage in 
pursuit” and “know when to stop”. When pursuing goals the Bolsheviks wanted to remain 
strong and on top of the game even when the effects were not immediately noticable, 
meanwhile avoiding aggressive reactions. When the opponents showed signs of weakness the 
Bolsheviks would not let go, but pursue in order to have a maximum payoff (George, 1969). 
3. ‘How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?’ (George, 1969, 
pp. 212) In the case of the Bolsheviks they provoked their opponents, the West, but, preferably, 
at their own expense. Even more so the Bolsheviks carefully calculated the risk and made sure 
they were in control of the intermediate steps. For instance they kept a close eye on situations 
that might provoke physical violence by the USA. In the meanwhile they made sure there was 
always a step available to avoid military confrontation at the very last moment. The main 
difference between the USA and the Soviets, concerning risks, was the limitations of means 
used while pursuing high payoff goals. The USA often deployed large and far-reaching means, 
while the Soviets limited them in pursuing same like goals, preventing escalation of the 
situation.  
4. Does the actor seize opportunities to pursue its goals? The Bolsheviks either seized the 
opportunity to pursue or waited indefinitely, not provoking its opponents in order to avoid 
catastrophe, with no options in between (George, 1969). This question is related to the 
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'Weltanschauung' question of whether the actor believes to be able to influence the course of 
action. Besides seizing opportune moments to pursue his goals an actor may also have a 
strategy to pick and choose carefully, always wait, or create opportunity.  
5. How are the means available best used by the actor in the situation at hand, while pursuing 
his goals? For instance the Bolsheviks used rude and sometimes even aggressive behaviour and 
language to deter opponents. Believing they would not lash out in an undiplomatic and 
emotional way (George, 1969). 
With this belief system in hand the researcher can understand what motivations and defences a 
political actor can have in certain situations. It helps to deepen the understanding of the 
development of the general situation at hand and why events evolve in the direction they do. The 
beliefs system offers an insight into the decision-making process of a political actor while at the 
same is not linked to a psychodynamic character (George, 1969). 
George’s theory was reviewed and further developed by other scholars. One who made a 
significant contribution, and who was mentioned before, is Holsti. Walker took Holsti’s model and 
combined it with possible answers to George’s other question and created certain typologies. He 
emphasises that an operational code cannot be applied to any actor and situation to accurately 
predict the eventual course of action. Walker goes on to stress that the beliefs system is not the only 
influencing factor in the decision-making process of an actor. He argues that these beliefs influence 
the way information is perceived and processed (1990). With the operational code George moved 
away from the classical rational-actor model in which it is assumed that all actors act the same 
under uncertain circumstances. The operational code argues that they differ depending on the 
unique set of beliefs that actors have. In his article Walker presents his four more generalised types 
of belief system an actor may have: 
‘Type A: Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by human misunderstanding and 
miscommunication. A “conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and impulsive responses is the 
major danger of war. Opponents are often influenced by non rational conditions, but tend to respond 
in kind to conciliation and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a leader’s ability and 
willingness to shape historical development. The future is relatively predictable, and control over it 
is possible. Instrumental: Establish goals within a framework that emphasises shared interest. 
Pursue broadly international goals incrementally with flexible strategies that control risk by 
avoiding escalation and acting quickly when conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasise resources 
that establish a climate for negotiation and compromise and avoid the early use of force. 
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Type B: Philosophical: Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike sites; miscalculation and 
appeasement are the major causes of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable. Optimism is 
warranted regarding realisation of goals. The political future is relatively predictable, and control 
over historical development is possible. Instrumental: One should seek optimal goals vigorously 
within a comprehensive framework. Control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic 
and resource may be appropriate, including the use of force when it offers prospects for large gains 
with limited risk. 
Type C: Philosophical: Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the state system to 
reflect the latent harmony of interests. The source of conflict is the anarchical state system, which 
permits a variety of causes to produce war. Opponents vary in nature, goals, and responses to 
conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic about goals unless the state system is changed, 
because predictability and control over historical development is low under anarchy. Instrumental: 
Establish optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive framework. Pursue shared goals, but 
control risks by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly when conciliation opportunities arise 
and delay escalatory actions whenever possible; other resources than military capabilities are useful. 
Type DEF: Philosophical: Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature (D), nationalism (E) 
or international anarchy (F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war. Opponents may vary, 
and responses to conciliation or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over the long run and in 
the short run depends upon the quality of leadership and a power equilibrium. Predictability is 
limited, as is control over historical development. Instrumental: Seek limited goals flexibly with 
moderate means. Use military force if the opponent and circumstances require it, but only as a final 
resource’ (1990, pp. 411). 
Drawing on the ten questions concerning 'Weltanschauung' and instrumental beliefs of the 
political actor with support of the types from Holsti and Walker it is not the purpose of this study to 
compare the different operational codes of Turkey and Russia towards BiH with each other or with 
those of other actors. But to get a deeper understanding of the motives, goals and purposes of the 
actors for their policy towards BiH. As stated before both George and Walker acknowledged that the 
models provided would not be able to accurately predict future actions of political actors. It is 
therefore my interpretation that George did not set up his theory and model to systematically 
analyse the characteristics of actors to predict their decision making. But to discover, observe and 
analyse their beliefs systems in order to better understand how these may influence the decision 
making process. Fully accepting that decisions were influenced by far more than just the belief 
system of the actor.  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5. Methodology 
This study focusses on deepening the understanding of the situation in BiH, therefore the study 
will follow a qualitative, rather than a quantitative, line of research. A qualitative research method is 
more appropriate as I seek to study two units of analysis, Turkey and Russia, through soft data. A 
qualitative study will allow me to observe and follow the sometimes confusing and changing 
situation of real life to produce new hypotheses. A quantitative study would focus on hard data in 
the form of numbers, surveys and large amount of interviews. As this study focusses to categorise 
media reports, statements and press releases according to George’s theory it does not work with 
quantifiable data. This type of research focusses on closely examining the situation at hand to make 
sense of what is going on and allow for soft data to be collected such as, but no limited to, 
statements, press releases and speeches, over a certain period of time. A qualitative study allows for 
a nonlinear path to be taken which allows collection and reexamining of data along the way. With 
the need to always look forward but also allowing backwards and sideways analysis to make sense 
of newly collected data. Finally it requires a researcher to look at the situation from different points 
of view, allowing them to explain all sides (Neuman, 2014). 
Type of study and unit of analysis 
The research presented in this thesis focusses on different cases, the foreign policy of Russia and 
Turkey towards BiH. In applying the theoretical framework and establishing a solid analysis the 
current situation of the country should also be considered and therefore intertwined into the 
analysis. As stated in chapter four the development and flow of certain political situations influence 
actors and their decision making process. In their theories George, Holsti and Walker all focus on 
individuals within the foreign affairs department, with great influence over the decisions making 
process or as decision makers themselves. In this study the unit of analysis is not limited to 
individuals but concentrated on different governments. All actions, statements, policies and 
decisions made by the government of either country will be included as data. 
In this research theory is build while data is collected and analysed, in order to create close links 
between the data and the theory, adjusting and changing direction along the way (Neuman, 2014). 
By observing and analysing the data from the current situation in BiH combined with the actions, 
statements, policies and decisions of Turkey and Russia inferences can be made about their 
operational codes. By moving between theory and data new sources can be discovered and 
inferences and conclusions can be refined. It leaves room for the researcher to fully examine the 
different contexts of the cases at hand. 
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Context of time 
All data between 2009 and early 2017 has been considered and analysed for this study. This 
particular period has been chosen as Ahmet Davutoğlu became Minister of Foreign Affairs for the 
APK government of Turkey. In this new position he was able to implement his earlier published 
treatise on what he believed should be the direction of foreign policy for the Turkish government. 
As a result a different stance can be observed towards the Balkans and other international powers. 
The foreign policy takes a very clear position on the Muslim community in the region. It 
emphasises the shared Ottoman heritage and history and how this should be used to strengthen its 
relations and international position. At this same time different ethno-national parties of BiH have 
become more opposed towards each other and moved away from Western influences. The latter’s 
diminishing role has opened a power vacuum of which both units of analysis have been able to take 
advantage. It is over this period of time that we can also observe the increasing influence of Russia 
in the RS and amongst its Serbian population. 
Reliability and validity 
Over time much data has been generated by different sources, with different kind of views and 
orientations about the relationship between Russia and BiH and Turkey and BiH. By consulting the 
available sources in the established period of time, and by examining a variety of sources, 
consistency can be guaranteed. The data used within this research is freely accessible to all who 
wish to examine it. It has been obtained from news papers, official statements by governments and 
analyses of independent international research organisations such as the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Articles presented by either kind of sources 
were verified by researching if other news agencies, official papers or independent international 
organisations reported the same data. By using different sources with different points of view biased 
data was prevented, for example, news reports by Balkan Insight might be Western-oriented 
providing data that may be incomplete or distorted about Russia’s position. Obtaining Russian 
statements, academic analysis and analysis of independent organisations on the same issues allowed 
for a more balanced view. The statements of the Turkish and Russian government can provide a 
further insight in the belief system of these actors. Academic articles, publications and research 
have been analysed concerning the position of Turkey and Russia towards BiH. The findings of 
these academic works can shed new light on the found data, help progress the study, but also verify 
made inferences and conclusions. An informal interview with experts concerning the region who, in 
light of their position, wish to remain anonymous, will be used to verify found data. 
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As a researcher I accept that within this study not all actors, events and possible sources have 
been analysed. This has been impossible both because of time constraint and because sources, such 
as ambassadors, foreign ministries and other important actors were unwilling or not allowed to 
make official statements concerning this subject. Therefore this study is open to whomever wishes 
to read it. Reactions and criticism are welcomed to help evolve and improve future research by 
myself and that of others. 
Hypotheses 
Considering the renewed interest of Russia and the more active role of Turkey in the region. And 
with the common history and culture of the different ethnicities actively deployed as a soft power 
tool. Based on the historical analysis, the data collected and the theoretical framework the following 
hypotheses are formed: 
1. The religious motivated foreign policy rhetoric of Turkey strengthens the position of the 
Muslim Bosnians to resist secession of RS and entrenches the ethnic divide. 
2. The foreign policy of Russia and Serbia strengthens the position of the Bosnian Serbs in RS 
in favour of secession and entrenches the ethnic divide. 
3. The foreign policy of Turkey and Russia, by entrenching the ethnic division prevents 
integration of the two different ethnic groups in BiH, Bosniak and Serb. 
While analysing the two cases the main concept is to understand the belief system and 
“operational code” of the units of analysis. To construct a comprehensive and clear image of what 
the belief system of each actor is, George broke it down in to two categories, the 'Weltanschauung' 
beliefs and the Instrumental beliefs and constructed five questions per category. Each question has 
been extensively explained to find relevant data and formulate concrete answers. For this study 
these questions and elaborations will be further narrowed down in order to relate data to the 
different questions. The questions are broken down in categories which are further broken down 
into possible indicators to help organise the collected data. The literature review and the table show 
us that answers to George’s questions are not mutually exclusive but interrelate. Data found can 
relate to multiple questions, and answers to these questions may help us to organise data for other 
questions and formulate answers. 
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'Weltanschauung' questions
Actors world view Optimistic / 
Pessimistic
Is the future 
transparent, 
predictable and 
influenceable
Influential over 
course of action
Chance or 
interconnectedness
World constant at 
conflict caused by 
human nature, 
interrupted by 
peace.
Goals can be 
achieved, this is 
clearly voiced and 
action is taken, 
even though this 
might upset 
opponents.
Convinced about 
the future and 
committed to goals 
towards it.
Course of action is 
set, the outcome 
certain and cannot 
be influenced.
Behind every event 
and action there is 
a strategy of 
opponents to 
progress or to 
frustrate the actor.
World constant at 
conflict caused by 
nations, interrupted 
by peace.
Actor treads 
carefully afraid of 
upsetting his 
opponents.
Seizing every 
opportunity to 
progress towards 
goals.
Course of action is 
fluid and is 
influenceable.
Some events are 
due to chance, 
reaction might be 
needed but without 
distrust towards 
other actors.
World constant at 
conflict caused by 
the international 
system, interrupted 
by peace.
Clear goals with 
high achievability, 
which may be 
voiced.
Convinced about 
influence over the 
situation at hand 
and the flow of 
events in it.
Seizing 
opportunities to 
progress.
Believing to be able 
to muddle through 
situations.
World constant at 
peace, interrupted 
by moments of 
conflict caused by 
human nature.
Taking action and 
seizing 
opportunities to 
progress.
Future is ever 
changing 
depending on the 
flow of events.
Passive attitude 
towards 
opportunities and 
action.
Only right and 
wrong decisions 
exist.
World constant at 
peace, interrupted 
by moments of 
conflict caused by 
nations.
Unclear goals, and 
no clear statements 
of achievability.
Actor is passive 
and doesn’t seize 
opportunities to 
progress.
Reactive towards 
other actors and 
takes action when 
situation changes 
or opportunities 
arise.
Accidents are 
considered to play 
or have played a 
role in the course of 
events.
World constant at 
peace, interrupted 
by moments of 
conflict caused by 
the international 
system.
Passive attitude 
towards the flow of 
events and not 
taking advantage of 
opportunities.
Unable to influence 
the situation at 
hand or the flow of 
events.
Sees himself as all 
knowing and able 
to change direction.
Statements about 
influence of the 
international 
community.
Sees possibilities 
for solutions and 
opportunities.
Flow of history and 
therefore the future 
is ever changing.
Is dependent upon 
other actors in 
taking course of 
action.
Advocating peace, 
or seeing only 
conflict and 
problems.
Foresees 
problems.
Flow of history is 
constant and 
predictable, policy 
is based on it.
Communicates, 
consults and works 
together with other 
actors.
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Need for balancing 
power and being 
ready for conflict 
(Realism)
Optimism declines 
over time when 
goals are not 
reached or 
leadership quality 
diminishes. 
Multiple roads are 
able to lead to 
achieving the goal, 
actor is flexible in 
changing direction.
Constantly 
searching for 
compromise and 
strengthening 
economic 
relationships and 
believing in 
interdependency 
(Liberalism).
Working according 
to and judging by 
international norms, 
values, standards 
and laws 
(Idealism).
Helping to develop 
democracies, 
creating economic 
dependency and 
affirming the 
importance of the 
international rule of 
law and community.
Opponents are 
rational and can be 
persuaded or 
forced in directions.
Opponents are 
different from each 
other and have 
different ways to 
pursue them.
'Weltanschauung' questions
Actors world view Optimistic / 
Pessimistic
Is the future 
transparent, 
predictable and 
influenceable
Influential over 
course of action
Chance or 
interconnectedness
Instrumental questions
Goal selection 
(Optimising 
strategy or 
Adventures)
Pursuing of goals Risk calculation, 
control and 
acceptance
Seizing opportunity 
or passive attitude 
towards it
Means exploitation
Clear goals with 
clear wins.
Actor knows when 
to stop.
Risk is calculated 
before action is 
pursued.
Ability to influence 
flow of events and 
course of action.
Soft power is used 
to pursue goals.
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Multiple goals in 
multiple categories 
with different levels 
of payoff.
Pursues goals 
taking the strength 
and strategy of 
opponents into 
consideration.
The flow of events 
and the 
opportunities within 
them can be 
controlled.
Seizes every 
opportunity at hand 
to progress.
Attitude towards 
other actors.
Unclear goals, 
muddling through 
and no clear 
payoffs.
Works together on 
achieving goals.
There is only the 
possibility for right 
choices, therefore 
risk to failure is 
unacceptable and 
this course of 
action is avoided.
View on the 
strength of 
opponent and the 
likelihood of it being 
deployed.
Ways means are 
used, provoking or 
not.
Participation and 
promotion of goals 
and clear strategies 
in achieving them.
Pursues goals and 
seizes 
opportunities 
regardless of 
results.
Willingness to risk 
all, but in the end 
retreat.
Aware of 
opponents possible 
reaction to course 
of action when 
seizing opportunity 
and does not want 
to provoke.
Applies relevant 
means in situation 
to progress.
Committing to 
domestic and 
international goals.
Aggressive tactics 
in pursuing goals.
Reactive towards 
actions of 
opponents, not 
calculating and 
overseeing 
consequences of 
actions.
Passive attitude 
towards 
opportunities 
unwilling to provoke 
opponents.
Is able to develop 
means into tools of 
soft power to 
influence other 
actors.
No clear 
commitments to 
international goals.
Passive-Aggressive 
tactics in pursuing 
goals.
Shared or no 
control over the 
flow of events and 
the opportunities 
within them.
Using means to 
prevent conflict and 
promote 
compromise.
Vague 
commitments to 
other governments 
and leaders about 
goals.
Risk acceptance is 
high because of 
possible high 
payoffs or the 
action is believed 
necessary.
Means are limited 
and based on their 
relevance to the 
situation and the 
goal pursued.
Actor believes to be 
all knowing, able to 
oversee 
consequences and 
sets criteria for 
selecting the best 
option.
Actor is able to take 
advantage of the 
weaknesses of 
opponents and 
other actors and 
uses these against 
them.
Instrumental questions
Goal selection 
(Optimising 
strategy or 
Adventures)
Pursuing of goals Risk calculation, 
control and 
acceptance
Seizing opportunity 
or passive attitude 
towards it
Means exploitation
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Selecting goals that 
do not trigger 
negative and 
possible violent 
reactions from 
opponents.
Convinced of own 
strength and 
therefore lack of 
risk calculation and 
control.
Selecting goals that 
benefit the actor 
but also other 
nations.
Avoiding escalation 
with opponents.
Selecting goals that 
benefit the actor 
but also the 
international 
community.
Risks can be 
controlled by 
limiting the means.
Goals are 
interconnected but 
also independent of 
each other.
How strong is the 
opponent perceived 
to be.
Instrumental questions
Goal selection 
(Optimising 
strategy or 
Adventures)
Pursuing of goals Risk calculation, 
control and 
acceptance
Seizing opportunity 
or passive attitude 
towards it
Means exploitation
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6. Data analysis 
The data collected from each case has been categorised according to George’s questions. 
Statements, policy decisions and actions will be related to each question. The answer to the question 
is then based on this and possible before mentioned data to establish the operational code of Russia 
and Turkey towards BiH. In this analysis references such as “the government of”, “the party” or the 
countries name refer to the political leadership which was active during the selected time period. 
For Russia this refers to the party and administration of President Putin and in the case of Turkey to 
the APK party of President Erdoğan. Therefore the statements and conclusions drawn do not 
necessarily represent the opinion and preferences of the population of the respected country but 
merely that of their representative government. The analysis will first discuss the 'Weltanschauung' 
questions followed by the instrumental questions for the case of Turkey followed by Russia. 
Turkey 
'Weltanschauung' questions 
1. How does the actor perceive his opponents in the international community? 
Turkey perceives the world, according to its foreign policy, as interdependent in which 
economic, cultural and social ties play an important role (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Resolution of Conflicts and Mediation). In line with this view Rüma stated in 2011 that the 
Turkish government engaged the Balkans in a more liberal way, mostly through economic powers, 
moving away ‘from its conventional roots in the realist/conservative school, which exclusively 
emphasises political-security relations’ (Rüma, 2011, pp 134). The use of soft liberal power tools 
can be observed in for instance the government investing a 100 million euros in agriculture. In 2015 
Turkey promised to invest another 50 million in small and medium enterprise. It increased its 
foreign exchange, enabled visa free travel and dual citizenship for Balkan citizens. Lastly Turkey 
invests through NGO’s in the rebuilding of cultural sites in BiH. This support came at a convenient 
time for Izetbegović, the leader of the Bosniak SDA party. He was struggling to maintain his 
position and moved the attention of the Bosniaks towards Turkey and away from the West (Jukic, 
2015). In its foreign policy synopsis it states that it believes that the international community is a 
positive force for peace and stability in the region, and that global problems can only be solved 
globally, through cooperation. In this, human activity is at the core of Turkish foreign relations. It 
states to be peace oriented and working towards peace at home and in the world (Republic of 
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Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign Policy). The APK sees the 
Balkans, and especially BiH, as a priority to guarantee stability in its direct neighbourhood. 
Working towards such stability it utilises economic, historical, cultural and human advantages in 
cooperation with international organisations (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Relations with the Balkan Region). Concerning this world view the government believes it should 
take a more active role in the region which is based on several principles. One states that Turkey 
should stop seeing its neighbours as a threat and utilise its common cultural and historical heritage 
(Mitrovic, 2014 & Türbedar, 2011). The principle can be observed in the rapprochement of Turkey 
towards Serbia. With this renewed relationship it hopes to be able to influence the RS leadership 
and population (Rüma, 2011). Concerning its role in the international and regional political sphere 
Davutoğlu discusses in his treatise that the location of turkey has ‘advantages in its geographical 
area: (a) it is a geographical and a geopolitical centre and, hence, it has a geographical depth; (b) it 
is a historical centre and therefore it has a historical depth; (c) it is a cultural centre for the 
surrounding areas, owing to its linguistic, religious and cultural ties and affinities and can therefore 
exercise strong geo-cultural influence on its periphery; and (d) it is the centre of energy transit 
routes and can therefore exercise geo-economic influence’ (Cogos, 2013, pp. 134). This attitude can 
be observed in the trilateral meetings, called the Istanbul summit, Turkey organised between the 
main ethnic groups and their governments (Alexiev, 2014). Davutoğlu goes on to argue that he sees 
NATO as an important way for Turkey to increase its power in the Balkan region, The Ottoman 
heritage and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation are considered as mere alternatives (Mitrovic, 
2014). 
Davutoğlu also argues in his treatise that in the 20th century the different conflicts in the region 
threatened the old Ottoman states. Especially those with influence, such as Turkey. The policy of 
the other axis, the Catholic Austrian-Hungarians and the Slavic Orthodox, was aimed at 
exterminating the Islam. This policy enabled the other powers to flourish while the former Ottoman 
empire lacked behind (Cogos, 2013 & Mitrovic, 2014). Another principle of Turkeys foreign policy 
states it needs to balance its relations with Russia and the USA. Turkey views the latter as an ally. 
Davutoğlu argues that when the USA took a more active role on the world stage it could not align 
itself with either Germany or Russia concerning the Balkan area. Therefore it moved towards the 
Muslim minorities to gain influence and tip the power balance to its advantage (Mitrovic, 2014). 
The diminishing interest by the EU in its enlargement policy has forced Turkey to alter its position 
towards the Balkans in need of economic and political allies. Such a shift might turn Turkey into a 
competitor of the EU in the Balkan (Bechev, 2012). Following the attempted coup in 2016, 
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President Erdoğan demanded the closure of the Gülen educational facilities in BiH and elsewhere. 
Stating that in not doing so the governments of those nations were in fact supporting terrorism (Toe, 
2016). 
From this analysis we can assume the Turkish government, from 2009 onward, believed BiH to 
be relatively harmonious. Conflict might be possible due to misinterpretation by the ethnic groups. 
Evidence for the harmonious view can be found in the use of economic, cultural and social tools. Its 
liberal orientation towards diplomacy by moving away from its realism-conservative roots. The 
willingness to cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally towards more stability in the region. The 
principal to refrain from seeing its neighbours as a threat. The orientation to solve global problems 
through international institutions. And believing NATO is the main way to increase its influence in 
the Balkan and BiH. Evidence for Turkeys believe that the misinterpretation by ethnic groups is at 
the root of conflicts can be found in its aims to approach all parties within BiH to increase stability 
and peace. Later on in the analysis we will also touch on statements made by high officials of the 
government which were badly interpreted. In response the government would offer context to the 
statements. Walker describes in his Type A how ‘(a) “conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and 
impulsive responses is the major danger of war’ (1990, pp. 411). Other indicators are the 
governments rapprochement towards Serbia to influence the population and leadership of the RS. 
And the trilateral diplomatic meetings it organised in Istanbul. 
After the attempted coup of 2016 we can make some observations that may indicate a change in 
the operational code. There is little evidence yet to establish such a change with certainty. Events, 
actions and statements will be discussed and inference made to show the changing attitude and 
beliefs of the government after the events for each question. Davutoğlu stated that during the 20th 
century the other axis aimed to exterminate the Islam in the Balkan, especially in BiH. He further 
discusses the need to balance relationships. Such statements may indicate a more realist view than 
liberal-idealist. The statement of President Erdoğan concerning the coupe and Gülen movement 
combined with Davutoğlu’s description of the regions history can indicate a belief that BiH is more 
conflictual. In this situation it may also believe that the other ethnic groups and international actors 
are out to annihilate their opponent, Turkey. However, clear indicators for such a shift are still 
lacking. While at the same time Turkey keeps supporting the bids of the different countries for 
NATO and EU accession (Anonymous, 2017). 
2. Is the actor optimistic or pessimistic about his ability to achieve his goals? 
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Concerning the optimistic or pessimistic stance of Turkey Davutoğlu made one of the clearest 
statements ‘Let us not forget the fate of the Ottoman state was sealed in the Balkans. If Turkey is 
unable to exercise influence outside its borders in the Balkans, it will not be in a position to play an 
active role, either in international relations or in general or in regional balances’ (Cogos, 2013, pp 
141). On the other hand the Muslim elite in the Balkans is sceptical towards Turkish interest in the 
region. With EU interest declining it may force them towards Turkey. On the other hand Turkey 
should not believe it can establish a level of influence, comparable to the US or Russia globally, in 
the region while pursuing its current strategies (Petrovic & Reljic, 2011). Davutoğlu states he views 
the Dayton agreements as a temporary solution. He considers Turkey to be in a good position for 
mediation between the different ethnicities to resolve problems. Even if this means Turkey has to sit 
down with those who have opposing interests (Mitrovic, 2014). 
Turkey has been able to succeed where other western powers have failed in negotiations between 
ethnic groups. It has been able to use its economic increase and size to a positive effect. Parties 
involved preferred a dialogue in a diplomatic way under Turkish supervision after the Butnik talks 
failed. The Istanbul summit and the signing of the declaration by Serbia and Bosnia is considered 
one of the great accomplishments of Turkish mediation. The declaration is praised for two points in 
particular. 1) All signatories commit to stabilisation and peace within the region. And 2) a visit of 
the Bosnian President to Belgrade, whom is known for voicing strong opinions about Serbia and its 
political leadership. The meetings that followed committed the signatories to support each others 
EU bid for accession. While at the same time overcoming their shared but difficult history by 
bringing to trial those responsible. Working together on acceptance and condemning of war crimes. 
And moving from reconciliation to institutionalisation and cooperation to boost the economy. And 
to collaborate in areas such as ‘culture, heritage, education, military and security’ (Alexiev, 2014, pp 
65) (Alexiev, 2014). Internationally ‘Turkey parades as champion of the Balkan Muslims’ (Bechev, 
2016). The financial crisis has left its economy unaffected making it a stable and interesting partner 
for Balkan countries (Bechev, 2012). A stable region is important for Turkeys emerging economy. 
Instability would threaten its economic growth and potential role in international affairs. This may 
explain the shift of attention towards Syria and the aftermath of the Arab spring in the Middle East 
(Bechev, 2016 & Türbedar, 2011). As stated before President Erdoğan is making demands for 
closure of Gülen facilities, a sign that he believes to have more influence in BiH. Such a believe is 
confirmed by political leaders from BiH stating ‘We don’t need these schools, we have our own 
system’ (Rose, 2016). 
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From this analysis we may derive that from 2009 onward Turkey had an optimistic belief about 
the achievability of its objectives. At the same time it is aware of its limitations and need to tread 
carefully. The latter may indicate a certain pessimism, if it is unable to succeed in the Balkan it will 
be unable to succeed at all. Evidence for such an assumption can be found in the constant 
reengagement in multi- and bilateral meetings. Davutoğlu’s statements on how Turkey is in a great 
position for mediation. The believe in the important role of the Balkans in Ottoman history. Its 
emerging economy and the accomplishments following the Istanbul summit. Over time we may 
observe Turkeys increasing believe in optimism. As it seems to tread less carefully and worries less 
about possible limitations. A change in behaviour like this can be due to the realisation of goals or 
successes. Walker describes such behaviour in his typologies at type B, stating ‘(o)ptimism is 
warranted regarding realisation of goals’ (1990, pp. 411). Evidence for this development can be 
derived from President Erdoğan’s behaviour after the coup. 
3. Does the actor believe the flow of political events is deterministic or indeterministic, and 
how much influence does the actor believes to have to change the direction? 
The statement made by Davutoğlu, as mentioned before, concerning the fate of the Ottoman 
empire being determined in the Balkans points towards an indeterministic belief. However, he also 
‘ventures to claim that: “…between the 16th and the 19th centuries, Balkan history was a success 
story. We can reinvent and reestablish this success by creating a new political ownership, a new 
multicultural coexistence and a new economic zone”’ (Alexiev, 2014, p. 52). Laying strategically 
between different continents and connected to different cultures, Turkey views itself as an important 
centre of power for mediation. It has a more active foreign policy and has set up several successful 
diplomatic meetings in the past years. At the same time it sees itself as a leader in initiatives for 
peace and negotiation (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resolution of Conflicts and 
Mediation). Turkey believes to be an asset to the EU, bringing economic prosperity while holding 
an important regional position as energy transit country, host to refugees and stabilising force 
(Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). By strengthening its relations with Serbia it 
hopes to increase its influence over the Bosnian Serbs. The latter are not looking for Serbian 
unification but rather cooperate with Russia, diminishing Serbian influence in the RS (Rüma, 2011). 
Davutoğlu also acknowledges that there are different roads towards his goal, as he considers NATO 
to be the main road and the Ottoman heritage and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation are mere 
alternatives. By stating to consider NATO as the main road towards increased regional influence 
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and the Ottoman heritage and OIC as mere alternatives, Davutoğlu acknowledges there are more 
roads leading to his goals. 
The impact of increased Turkish influence in BiH becomes evident through statements of 
Bosniak citizens after the attempted coup in Turkey. Such as; ‘Turkey is really important for Bosnia, 
so what happens in Ankara or Istanbul has a big impact on our country’ 59 year old Sead Murtic; 
‘The Turkish government and citizens have helped our country a lot in the past … of course, we 
were deeply concerned after we found out what was happening on friday’ 20 year old Samir 
Zubovic; ‘In Bosnia, or at least in some regions, there is some kind of historical sentiment (of 
attachment) towards Turkey, which is also reflected in the attitude of some of the media’ Knotic 
(Toe, 2016). After the attempted coupe, the APK set out on a witch hunt against Fetullah Gülen and 
its followers. This movement has several schools in BiH which are now targeted by local Bosniak 
politicians who state “We don’t need these schools, we have our own system” (Rose, 2016). Other 
countries prefer the Turkish government not to intervene in its educational system. According to the 
Turkish government Gülen facilities are breeding grounds for terrorism. Therefore not closing down 
the schools is a sign off support to the coup. Other BiH politicians state that the Gülen schools are 
run according to the law and closure should be determined by independent BiH authorities (Toe, 
2016). Demonstrations at the Dutch embassy in Sarajevo shows how the tensions between the 
Turkish government and the West can spill over into the Balkans (Balkan Insight, 2017). 
As discussed before the Turkish government, in 2009, had an optimistic belief in reaching its 
goals. It perceives itself able to influence the parties and situation in the Balkans, and within BiH, to 
move towards stabilisation and peace. At the same time it accepts the possibility of destabilisation 
and renewed conflict. Pursuing economic growth and strengthening its influence both regionally 
and internationally it focussed on to different paths and utilised different soft power tools. For 
instance by both using its seat in NATO, its shared history and culture and economic strength. 
Turkey can hardly be considered as deterministic as it actively reacts to opportunities, seizing them 
to progress. For instance by initiating multilateral diplomatic meetings between BiH, Serbia and 
Croatia and exploiting its economic growth when the EU was dealing with a financial crisis.  
After the coup Turkey may be moving towards a more deterministic belief, convinced it would 
eventually achieve both regional and international influence. Such an attitude may be observed in 
the administrations actions, demanding closure of facilities of the Gülen movement. On the other 
hand, George argues that a deterministic regime is passive and doesn’t create opportunity. In 
Turkeys actions, statement and policies we still observe an active approach, where opportunities are 
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seized to progress and might even be created. Evidence can be found in the continuing financial 
investments, political support for pro-Turkey leaders, and strengthening its Muslim connection. 
4. Does the actor believe to have influence, and how much, over the direction of the course of 
action? 
The Turks and Bosniaks have a long history. During the wars in the 90’s the Turkish government 
was first in supporting the Bosniaks before the EU or USA. Ignoring the arms embargo of the UN 
and cooperating in the no fly zones and the UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR). The EU and USA 
preferred and stimulated Turkish involvement, favouring its moderate Islam. The two believed its 
shared culture and history could be used to influence the Bosniaks (Janjevic, 2017 & Mitrovic, 
2014). More recently such influence by Turkey in BiH and other Balkan countries is dependent on 
its relationship with the EU. When it strived for EU accession, having a strong relationship with the 
Union, Turkish influence in the region flourished. It was Brussels that pushed and pulled Turkey 
towards a more active role in the Balkans. In aspiring candidacy the EU demanded more economic 
engagement, which resulted in trade agreements and dismantling economic barriers (Bechev, 2012). 
Turkey may find its influence diminishing with the EU loosing interest in it and Turkey openly 
opposing some of its members and policies. On the other hand this position has also proven to be 
strengthening its influence as the Balkan population is getting disappointed in the West and 
observes a lack of EU interest towards its region (Bechev, 2016, Janjevic, 2017 & Mitrovic, 2014). 
This diminishing interest of the EU for expansions in the Balkans has ‘opened opportunity for other 
players such as Turkey, but also Russia and even China, to fill in the gaps’ (Bechev, 2012, pp. 139). 
The EU also finds itself, together with the USA, distracted from the area by other international 
issues. Which leaves a power vacuum in BiH to be filled by Russia and Turkey (Bilefsky, 2016). In 
the informal interview it was confirmed the EU has a lot of other issues in need of its attention, but 
that it was still engaged in BiH (Anonymous, 2017). Although the current government of Turkey 
would not prefer a destabilised region, it would not shy away from it, if it could be used to achieve 
international goals (Janjevic, 2017). Turkey actively promotes its Muslim connection with the 
region and uses it to work with non-state actors for diplomacy, which also include political parties 
(Rüma, 2011). Its influence is successful amongst dominantly Muslim countries where high 
percentages approve of the relationship with Turkey (Albania 75.1%, BiH 60.2%, Kosovo 93.2%, 
and Macedonia 76.6%). The picture is quite different in countries not dominantly Muslim (Croatia 
26.7%, Montenegro 33.5%, and Serbia 18.2%) (Mitrovic, 2014). 
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The explanation for this difference can be found in statements made both by Davutoğlu ‘You are 
most welcome as well, because Anatolia belongs to you; and make sure that Sarajevo is 
ours’ (Alexiev, 2014, p. 53), ‘Bosnians have “78 million friends,’ and that millions of Turks “were 
here, are here now and will always be here”’ (Sputnik International, 2016). Or from his speech of 
October 2009 in which he states that the Balkans can escape their perpetual victim role from the 
international powers by reverting to the Ottoman state where different ethnicities, religions and 
cultures live peacefully alongside each other. We can observe same like statements from President 
Erdoğan: ‘Do not forget: Turkey is Kosovo and Kosovo is Turkey!’ (Alexiev, 2014, pp 67). 
Davutoğlu goes on to say that the Turkish foreign policy aims to stabilise the Balkans by engaging 
with all ethnic group. The Ottoman empire was composed of different ethnicities living peacefully 
along side each other. Turkey therefore aims to support all efforts to protect and preserve the 
different cultures and their educational rights. These are not empty statements, as the government 
has supported several initiatives in Serbia and other countries. Though these are still mainly 
focussed on Muslim populated areas. We can observe such a Muslim orientation again in the 
initiative to establish ‘a small Balkan UNESCO for protecting the “Ottoman-Turkish cultural 
heritage” or, if this does not get enough support, for promoting “the cooperation for ensuring the 
cultural and educational rights of ethnic communicates with different cultural 
backgrounds”’(Cogos, 2013, pp. 141). Turkey goes on to state that it is collaborating on issues 
concerning culture, education, science and sport with BiH. This can be observed from NGO’s like 
the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the Gülen Movement, Islamic brotherhoods, and others having made a 
considerable difference by investing on these issues in BiH. Turkey has also been able to export its 
culture via popular soap opera’s, news channels, offering cheap holidays to Turkey, allowing visa 
free travel and dual citizenship (Birnbaum, 2013, Borger, 2016, Mitrovic, 2014, & Toe, 2015). In 
his rhetoric and treatise Davutoğlu identifies different minorities in different states by using labels 
such as “Turkish”, “Ottoman” or “Muslim” enabling him to reach out to specific groups within 
Balkan countries (Cogos, 2013). These statements, policies and actions give rise to strong 
arguments by both academics and political leaders that Turkey has a hidden Ottoman agenda. Milos 
Solaja, professor of political science in Banja Luka, stated ‘Bosnia was once part of the Ottoman 
empire and Turkey is obviously trying to exploit these connections to try and build a bigger 
influence in the country’ (Toe, 2015). Many ethnic groups remember the Ottoman era differently 
from Turkeys image. They observe an expansionist thirst, to which Turkey should respond by 
treading more carefully, maintaining its moderate Islamic image and respect for democratic and 
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sovereign values of other states. This kind of rhetoric gives political leaders, such as Dodik, the 
necessary ammunition to damage the relationship of BiH with Turkey. He claims Turkey is aiming 
to gain more control, political and economic advantage. While at the same time promoting his 
agenda for secession (Alexiev, 2014, Mitrovic, 2014, Petrovic & Relic, 2011 & Türbedar, 2011). 
Such resistance is evident in Serbia’s reaction stating it considers Turkey as a friend and ally. 
Favouring financial investment, economic cooperation and in working towards regional stability. 
But it will not fall under Ottoman reign again as it has in the past (Türbedar, 2011). The Turkish 
government often tried to reassure its opponents and allies of its open diplomacy. It reaffirmed its 
open attitude towards nations, parties and groups that had opposing beliefs. And by offering context 
to statements which were badly received (Alexiev, 2014, Cogos, 2013, Mitrovic, 2014, Petrovic & 
Relic, 2011 & Türbedar, 2011). 
The events following the coup demonstrate an increased belief of influence by Turkey in BiH. It 
finds confirmation in the reactions of citizens and Bosniak politicians. What might also be 
important to consider here is the pride of the Bosnian population in their ethnic and national identity 
‘(a)ccording to U.N. polling results in 2013, over 90% of Bosniak, Croat and Serb respondents 
expressed pride in their ethnic identity’, pride of BiH citizenship differs greatly, the Bosniaks are 
most proud of their BiH citizenship and the Serbs least, but ‘an overwhelming majority of 
respondents across all ethnic groups expressed pride in their regional/town identity (87% to 89%) 
and religious identity (90% to 93%)” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2016, pp. 16). 
From this analysis we may assume that the Turkish government believes to have considerable 
influence over the course of action. From 2009 onwards Turkey believed its main sources of 
influence to be the shared desire for EU integration, its position within NATO and relation with the 
USA. It perceives its economic growth and ability to invest in BiH as a mother source of influence. 
Its shared culture, Ottoman history and heritage and its position as energy transit country. Turkey 
has been able to gain influence over opposing parties by establishing itself as a neutral mediator. It 
also believes to be in a leading position concerning diplomatic and peace negotiation. Further 
solidifying its believe to have regional and international influence. Later on the relationship with 
certain EU countries and position towards certain policies changed. This proved to be a fruitful 
strategy as dissatisfaction with Western institutions amongst the Balkan, and especially with BiHs, 
population grew. Turkey believed this to be a new source of influence while continuing to exploit its 
connections with Muslim communities. It focussed on its shared culture, Ottoman history and 
heritage and its economic strengths. The latter developments have been rather counter progressive 
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with other ethnic groups. In these actions they see their image confirmed of a Turkey with 
expansionist thirst and a hidden Ottoman agenda. 
Turkey’s influence can be observed in reaching trade agreements, the appointment of a Bosnian 
ambassador to Belgrade and the Istanbul agreement. We can further observe the rebuilding of 
Ottoman and Muslim heritage across BiH and the establishment of Turkish schools. The demands to 
close Gülen facilities can be seen as evidence for Turkeys increased belief to wield influence in 
BiH. 
5. Does the actor believe in chance or in interconnectedness even where there is none? 
As mentioned before Davutoğlu believed that in the 20th century other powers aimed to 
exterminate ISlam in the Balkans. He goes on to explain the role of the USA supporting the Muslim 
community for its own gians. Turkey’s administration responded to the claims of having a hidden 
agenda by inviting, visiting and organising meetings with all parties time and again. It would often 
go on official record offering context to statements by Davutoğlu and President Erdoğan to 
reinforce its image as a neutral actor in the region. Over time the governments’ stance towards 
Russia and the EU changed. According to George these actions can be seen as muddling through. 
The administration is shifting strategies and accepting responsibility for so called “bad decisions”. 
Following this line Turkey continued to work towards multilateral agreements amongst parties and 
reached out to those with opposing beliefs. Here the Turkish government also reacted more to 
events instead of creating opportunities and tried to force situations to move in its favourable 
direction. On the other hand the actions by President Erdoğan after the attempted coup may indicate 
a renewed belief of interconnectedness. As the administration tried to force other nations to close 
Gülen facilities.  
I thus conclude that over time Turkey may have moved from a belief of interconnectedness, 
where outside powers planned to exterminate Islam, towards an attitude of muddling through and 
believing chance and accidents can shape the course of events and might now be steering back 
towards interconnectedness. 
Instrumental questions 
1. How are goals set and selected for political action? 
Besides organising diplomatic meetings the Turkish government states ‘(h)igh level dialogue, 
security for all, utmost economic integration and the preservation of the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural 
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and multi-religious social structures in the region’ as the ‘four main axes of Turkey’s Balkan policy’ 
(Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Relations with the Balkan Region). By showing 
interest in the Balkan region and especially in BiH the Turkish government is able to increase its 
domestic legitimacy. Many Turks originate from, and still have family living in the area (Junjevic, 
2017). 
Here the answers to the 'Weltanschauung' questions, and especially those concerning the believe 
in determinism and influence, are of importance. From 2009 onward the Turkish government can be 
observed to have an optimising strategy towards BiH. It pursues different objectives with different 
levels of pay off which could be pursued independently but also contribute to each other. This is in 
line with its belief being indeterministic and having influence over the course of action while also 
accepting limitations. Here we may assume that at the time the Turkish government did not believe 
to be all knowing. We may observe this from actions like shifting its goals, accepting wrong 
decisions and engaging different paths and possibilities. It believed to be unable to oversee all 
consequences of its actions. And in line with the optimising strategy escalation was to be avoided in 
order to not upset opponents. The strategy can be observed in its ability to reach out to all parties 
when discussions of its hidden agenda were raised and offered context for badly received 
statements. In its economic investments increasing over time, support to political elites within BiH, 
organising diplomatic meetings. The investment in restoring Muslim and Ottoman heritage. And 
representing the BiH Muslim community in international institutions and organisations, such as 
NATO. We may also observe it in its ability to export its culture through soap opera’s, educational 
facilities and enabling visa free traveling and dual citizenship. 
As has been discussed we may observe a change over time. The Turkish government may have 
moved more towards adventures. This can be observed from actions such as the demand for closure 
of Gülen facilities, its focus on Muslim communities and stance against any reform giving the RS 
more independence. 
2. How does the actor pursue his goals? 
The APK states it uses an active and open diplomatic strategy and focusses on economic and 
cultural development (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Synopsis of the Turkish 
Foreign Policy). The government also reports an increase in diplomatic visits since the 
implementation of Davutoğlus foreign policy (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Relations with the Balkan Region). As discussed before the Turkish government organised and took 
part in several diplomatic meetings and preceded over several negations between different ethnical 
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groups. It initiated the Istanbul summit, increased its financial and political support, exported its 
culture and arranged visa free travel and dual citizenship. 
From the analysis in previous questions and the answers given, we can assume the Turkish 
government, from 2009 onward, pursued an open, active and diplomatic strategy towards BiH. In its 
strategy Turkey takes the strengths and considerations of its opponents into account in order to 
avoid escalation. However, when opportunities aries it presses forward in pursuit of its goals. Over 
time the strategy can be seen to evolve to become more aggressive in which objectives are more 
actively pursued. In this new strategy less consideration is given to the reactions of opponents, 
ignoring their possible strength and impact on achieving the objectives. This development can be 
observed in the governments actions following the coup, focussing its attention on the Muslim 
community and opposing other ethnic groups and their leadership while supporting pro-Turkish 
leaders. 
3. ‘How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?’ (George, 1969, 
pp. 212) 
From the analysis in the previous questions it has become clear that the Turkish government is 
increasingly optimistic in achieving its objectives towards BiH. Overtime its belief in the level of 
influence it has over the course of actions has increased. At the same time it may be moving 
towards a belief in interconnectedness away from accepting chance to have a role in the flow of 
events. In line with this development the Turkish government seems to become increasingly unable 
to calculate and control the risks of its actions. The Turkish government’s strategy seems to be more 
reactive towards risks instead of careful calculations. And by continuing down this line it can be 
assumed that it accepts the risks of its actions beforehand. Time and again Turkeys actions upset 
certain political leaders or ethnic groups within BiH. This causes discussion on its true agenda 
towards BiH. In response to such allegations the Turkish government keeps promoting its 
independent stance, its international allies and open diplomatic achievements. While at the same 
time these statements and focussed financial and political aid provide opponents with ammunition. 
Evidence for this can be found in providing context for badly received policies and statements while 
on the other hand not diminishing them over time. It has organised diplomatic meetings between all 
parties even those opposing the Turkish beliefs. Cooperated with several international institutions 
and organisations towards peace and stability in BiH and its region. While focussing on 
development and financial investment in Muslim dominated areas, organisations and parties. Its 
support for Kosovo’s independence is also a highly disputed issue. It is questionable if the 
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resolution passed by Serbia condemning Srebrenica was due to Turkish diplomacy or a bid to gain 
favour with the International Court of Justice in its case against Kosovo (Bechev, 2012 & Türbedar, 
2011). It may thus be unable to oversee the timeline involved, overestimate their own risk 
calculations and the acceptance of it. Such a belief may become more obvious over time as can be 
observed in the events following the coup. As the government’s belief moves towards deterministic 
and having more influence over the flow of events, it may find it unnecessary to calculate and 
control risks. George argues that the Bolsheviks utilised limited means instead of ends, while the 
USA used a wide arrange of means in pursuing its goals and did not know when to stop. For George 
the latter was an indication for limited calculation, control and high acceptance of risks (1969). We 
can observe similarities between the USA, as analysed by George, and the Turkish strategy. 
On the other hand the Turkish strategy may be deliberate, as was the Boslhevik. It might want to 
appear to be provoking, rude, aggressive and willing to risk all in order to progress at the expense of 
its opponents. While at the same time being in control and able to calculate risks and avoid 
escalation. Although these assumptions have to be considered they seem unlikely. The Turkish 
government aims for peace and stability, economic growth and increasing influence amongst all 
parties in the region. Its strategies and policies have been in line with those of other Western 
powers. After the attempted coup some change may be observed but is to little too make any certain 
inferences (Anonymous, 2017).  
4. Does the actor seize opportunities to pursue its goals? 
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that 236 diplomatic missions have taken place in 
the past decade (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Synopsis of the Turkish Foreign 
Policy). The government often complains in the different international institutions and organisations 
to the EU for its interference and later on lack of interests in BiH. Turkey considers this attitude to 
be destabilising and harmful (Rüma, 2011). The previous analysis for several questions have 
already shown the large amounts of opportunities the Turkish government has seized or created to 
progress its objectives within BiH. For instance its financial investment and economic stability 
when the EU was dealing with its financial crisis. Exporting its culture via soap opera’s, education, 
visa free travel and dual citizenship. And the initiatives for diplomatic meetings between BiH, 
Serbia, Croatia and Turkey resulting in the Istanbul summit and declaration. From 2009 onward it 
seized opportunities while taking in consideration the reactions of its opponents. Over time this 
consideration seems to decrease as can be observed from the continuing religious-cultural 
statements, Muslim focussed investments and the events concerning the Gülen movement. 
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5. How are the means available best used by the actor in the situation at hand, while pursing 
his goals? 
On several occasions the Turkish government has shown to be able to deploy the best means 
available for the situation. It has been able to bring parties with opposing beliefs to the negotiation 
table resulting in meetings between those at the verge of conflict. Diplomatic meetings were 
organised between opposing nations and ethnic groups. These have resulted in the different actors 
becoming signatories to commitments for peace, stability and cooperation. It has deployed its 
economic and political support when the EU was dealing with its own financial and internal crisis 
and BiH’s pro-Turkish leaders were struggling to maintain their position. It has successfully 
exported its culture and used its changing position towards the EU. The latter has bolstered its 
approval rate amongst Muslim dominated countries and those dissatisfied and disappointed with the 
Western institutions.  
It has also often used means which resulted in negative outcomes. By emphasising its shared 
culture, Ottoman heritage and history it has more than once upset opponents and given rise to 
arguments about its possible hidden agenda. Such actions have been criticised for its focus on 
Muslim communities. 
Russia 
'Weltanschauung' questions 
1. How does the actor perceive his opponents in the international community? 
Russia’s perception of the fundamental nature of the political universe is discussed in its foreign 
policy. It states that it believes that economic power is shifting towards Asia. It observes an 
unbalanced development rate around the world which is one of the main reasons of current conflict. 
The strategies of the West are perceived to be aimed to stay at the centre of international political 
power and Russia identifies this as one of the main disturbances in the international community. 
Russia views force and military as ‘an increasingly important factor in international relations’ (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016, point 6). Here alliances and 
international institutions are unable to counter existing and emerging conflicts. Russia views the 
world constantly in competition for advantages over technology, finances and the energy market. 
Therefore it acknowledges the influence of soft power tools such as economic, legal, technological 
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and IT capabilities in international relations. Interconnectedness among states is perceived as an 
opportunity for economic growth. This interconnectedness also makes states interdependent. Russia 
identifies unbalanced development in the world and imposed ideology in the Middle East as a cause 
leading to terrorism. It believes such developments, combined with extremism, is best fault by 
international organisations, with the UN at the centre, with common values. In order to promote 
international law Russia is willing to work together with the leading states and NGO’s. In this light 
it emphasises non-interference in domestic affairs of state as one of the most important international 
agreements. Therefore it is against the responsibility to protect (R2P) and will counter attempts by 
certain states to change the UN charter. Concerning the Balkans Russia states it aims ‘to develop 
inter-State cultural and humanitarian ties between Slavic nations’ (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Russian Federation, 2016, point 45h). Russia believes that problems in the Balkans are 
mainly caused by the geopolitical expansions pursued by NATO and the EU. It is the unwillingness 
of these organisations to collaborate on a common security and cooperation framework is the main 
cause for ‘a serious crisis in the relations between Russia and the Western States’ (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016, point 61). It believed that the UN Security Council 
resolution on Srebrenica would provoke ethnic conflict and therefore vetoed it (The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2015). Concerning the referendum in the RS, Russia 
officially stated that it would prefer to see a dialogue between the RS and other parties. It identifies 
international actors and the OHR as the major obstructors (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Russian Federation, 2017). In 2010 Russia committed itself to working together with BiH to 
quickly meet the remaining conditions in order to phase out the OHR (The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2010).  
Concerning NATO, Russia perceives the international organisation as a direct threat to its 
security. Therefore tries to keep the Balkans at the least neutral in its alliances (Bershidsky, 2017). 
In a report of a conference concerning Russia in the Balkans, organised by the London School of 
Economics, experts argue that Russia is back in the Balkans to dent the image of the West. Not to 
prevent further EU or NATO expansion, but rather to have a foot in the door as to influence NATO 
or the EU via its members (2015). Lastly Petrillo made a strong argument concerning Russia’s 
world view. He states it is shaped by its desire to ‘remain a nuclear superpower, a great power in all 
facets of international activity, and the hegemon - the political, military, and economic leader - of its 
region’ (Pertrillo, 2013, pp. 1). Others confirm such a claim by stating that Russia wants to 
strengthen its relationship in the Balkans. Not for competing with the regional powers, but to 
challenge and discredit Western powers, institutions and organisations and increase its influence in 
H.B. van den Berg Leiden University !42
the international community (Knezevic, 2016 & Szpala, 2014). The fall of Yugoslavia and its failure 
to intervene and support its Slavic Orthodox brothers is seen by Russia as a humiliation amongst its 
own and foreign Slavic population (Knezevic, 2016). Concerning BiH in particular the focus of 
Russia on the RS and Dodik can be explained by the cooling relationship with Serbia. The latter is 
balancing its relations between Russia and the West (Bechev, 2016 & London School of Economics, 
2015). 
From this analysis we can assume that Russia believes BiH to be relatively harmonious. Where 
international institutions and organisations are the main source of conflict. Evidence for this belief 
can be found in the aim to balance economic and military power. Perceiving the development of the 
world to be unbalanced. Interpreting the strategy of the West to remain as centre of political power 
and identifying NATO and the EU as direct threats in the Balkan and BiH. Whether or not it is 
aiming to prevent further NATO and EU expansion in the Balkan, Russia identifies these and other 
Western institutions, actors and organisations to be at the core of crisis between Russia and the West 
and within BiH. It actively works to phase out the OHR as it believes to be an international 
organisation imposing policy on BiH. Therefore vetoes or abstains from votes in the UN Security 
Council concerning BiH and is against R2P.  
It can be observed to stimulates anarchy within BiH by supporting Dodik both politically and 
financially. This strategy seriously stalls political reform and entrenches ethnic division. Walker, in 
his type C, identifies an anarchical state system and the absence of consensus over interests to be a 
root for causes of war (1990).   
2. Is the actor optimistic or pessimistic about his ability to achieve his goals? 
Russia portrays itself to the world as a strong and influential international power and strives in 
many places to bolster this image. Concerning the region ‘Russia claims to protect Orthodox 
Slavs’ (Bechev, 2016), but has many more areas where its attention is needed. For instance in Syria 
or in resolving the issue in the Ukraine in order to lift its sanctions. It may also need more allies and 
international influence to reach an agreement concerning Eurasia with both the West and China 
(Bechev, 2016). In this light Russia is using the Balkans as a frozen conflict at the backdoor of the 
EU as leverage in international affairs (Szpala, 2014). On the other hand from analysis in the 
previous question it became clear it perceives NATO as a serious threat to its security. It seems 
successful in countering NATO’s expansion as the international organisation has voted down BiH’s 
possible active membership. The organisation states it believes Russia’s influence is to strong and 
may influence NATO’s order of business (IFIMES, 2013). BiH is already in the process of 
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becoming a NATO member, the vote only concerned its status which would allow it to influence 
policy and decisions (Anonoymous, 2017). We may therefore conclude Russia is optimistic in its 
belief to be able to balance other international powers in BiH and the Balkan. It continues down its 
chosen path in challenging and opposing NATO, the EU and other Western institutions and 
organisations. On the other hand it is also pessimistic as it perceives NATO and EU enlargement as 
a direct threat to its security. 
3. Does the actor believe the flow of political events and deterministic or indeterministic, and 
how much influence does the actor believes to have to change the direction? 
In its aim to stall the expansions and decrease the influence of Western actors, organisations and 
institutions Russia understands that states dominated by Serbs will soon be surrounded by NATO 
allies. It believes an unified Serbian nation would be Russia’s best weapon against NATO and EU 
enlargement and to increase regional influence (Gajic, 2015). Serbia, however, prefers to balance its 
relations between Russia and West. It knows all too well Russia alone cannot provide enough 
financial, political and military support. Serbia thus cooperation in multilateral military exercises 
with both Russian and NATO allies. It takes a neutral stance towards the RS referendum, it neither 
supports nor harshly condemns it. But, most notably, it has not joined in on the sanctions against 
Russia set by the EU (Pupavac & Pupavac, 2016 & Szpala, 2014). In response Russia makes it very 
clear to Serbia to priorities its relationship with Russia. The latter argues it is the main supplier of 
energy and gas, supplies loans and is its historical ally against the West and NATO (Szpalar, 2014). 
For the cooling relationship between Russia and Serbia, the Russian government can only blame 
itself. It has been unwilling to offer military supplies for discount prices and exempted certain 
products from the free trade agreement (Bechev, 2016).  
In response Russia moves its attention towards the RS where it finds a like-minded ally in Dodik. 
He is willing to openly and strongly oppose Western institutions, organisations and influences. The 
RS is particularly open to this relationship as it finds an ally in Russia in its bid for secession. 
Russian influence is boosted by the failure of the Western institutions and organisations in achieving 
their core objectives; developing local economy and democracy (Pupavac & Pupavac, 2016). 
Together with the government of the RS and Serbia, Russia is able to promote its version of the 
international situation and of history amongst the population. Here it depicts both Russians and 
Slavs as victims of the West. The Yugoslav disintegration is one of the leading examples together 
with the image of the EU and NATO forcing the Serbian states into integration. By promoting the 
shared history and culture Russia is able to shape an image of being a close ally with a thriving 
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economy and strong position in the international community (London School of Economics, 2015 
& Szpala, 2014).  
Over time the Russian government has become more willing to supply financial means to both 
Serbia and the RS to cope with their liquidity problems, without demand for financial reform. BiH 
found itself in financial trouble after the International Monetary Fund blocked its financial support 
to the country. The Fund decided the political leadership had not been able to implement the 
constitutional reform it desired. In response the RS turned to Russia for support which turned down 
its request by demanding commercial rates for loans and influence in public companies. After a 
second attempt the RS was able to secure a deal with an investor from Florida which, according to 
international sources, is known to be Russian. More recently Russia has offered to repay its Soviet 
dept to BiH, of which the RS would receive 33%. Russia has also changed its stance towards 
Serbia, supplying it with a wide range of military equipment in response to Croatia’s plans to 
purchase weapons from the USA (Bershidsky, 2017, Latal, 2015, Newropeans Magazine, 2017 & 
Szpala, 2014). Russia perceives its monopoly on energy and gas in the region as an important tool 
of influence, offering cheap prices to those favouring Russia. Experts argue that the monopoly does 
not equal influence, as there are still some independent companies and countries willing to stand up 
to Russia (Pupavac & Pupavac, 2016, Petrillo, 2016 & London School of Economics, 2015). 
In its foreign policy Russia states it views its policy as open, predictable and constant over time 
(The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016). It has also proven to be able to 
act quickly and flexible (London School of Economics, 2015). Indeed it has proven to be 
predictable and constant when it came to vetoing the Srebrenica resolution from the United 
Kingdom. In 2014 it abstained from the vote in the UN Security Council to extend the EUFOR 
mission in BiH. By which it indirectly said it could block the vote and disrupt regional stability. 
These actions have increased Russia’s popularity amongst the Serbian people (Bechev, 2016). 
Serbia has tried to be an intermediate between Russia and the RS as to weaken Dodiks rhetoric and 
move towards reform and stability. However, with the relationship with Russia cooling, Putin 
personally reached out to Dodik. While neither the Russian government nor Putin made clear 
statements about the meeting, it went a long way for Dodiks popularity. In a statement to the media 
he claimed that the ‘RS is a state and Russia is its ally’. At a later stage the Russian ambassador 
confirmed Russia’s support for Dodiks referendum. Which resulted in halting any reform not 
involving more independence for the RS (Szpala, 2014 & Bechev, 2016). The Balkan region, 
however, is not the main objective in the Russian foreign policy. It uses it as a playground to display 
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the ‘rivalry between Russia and other global and regional actors (e.g. the USA and the EU)’ (Szpala, 
2014, pp. 1). 
From this analysis we may conclude that Russia has a deterministic belief that it will be able to 
balance international influence in BiH, secure domestic legitimacy, survival of its own regime and 
stall NATO and EU enlargement. To do this, it believes its best course of actions is to unify the 
Serbian people and pit them against the Western institutions and organisations. The deterministic 
belief is combined with an indeterministic belief. This can be observed from its active attitude in 
which it seizes and creates opportunities and uses different tools to obtain its objectives. The belief 
of Russia in an unified Serbian nation as its best strategy against NATO and EU enlargement, can 
be interpreted as believing in a single path towards its objectives. On the other hand the usage of 
different soft power tools can be interpreted as multiple paths leading to its goals.  
Evidence for the deterministic belief can be observed in its behaviour in the UN Security 
Council. Russia is constant in its policies, statements and attitude towards international actors, 
institutions and organisations over time. We can also observe it in its reactions towards Serbia, 
trying to balance its relationships, its increasing support for the RS and Dodik and its ability to 
promote its views on the international situation and interpretation of history. The latter and Russia’s 
behaviour in the UNSC are also indicators of an indeterministic belief. It shows an active attitude 
and indicates Russia seizes opportunities when they arise. This can also be observed from shifting 
its attention towards the RS when the relationship with Serbia started to cool. Reengaging 
negotiations for both financial and military, mainly material, support for the RS and Serbia. The 
possible single path belief, based on Russia’s focus for a unified Serb nation, is strengthened by its 
promotion of its common Slavic culture and history. And by using its monopoly to increase 
popularity amongst the population. 
4. Does the actor believe to have influence, and how much, over the direction of the course of 
action? 
Russian influence in the Balkan, as is the Turkish, is highly dependent on the relationship with 
the EU. When such relations are strong they equal better relations with the Balkans. On the other 
hand, openly opposing the Western institutions, and in particular the EU, also increases popularity 
and influence amongst the Serbian populations, especially in the RS (Bechev, 2016). The failing 
Europeanisation in the Balkans is a tool often used by the Russian government to increase its 
legitimacy at home and abroad. The main objectives are, however, the survival of the Russian state 
and regime. It can therefore be observed to align itself with whatever party can support to reach its 
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goals. In return Russia defends these parties, but backs off when the threat becomes to big (London 
School of Economics, 2015). 
The EU finances are closely connected to the Balkans, which resulted in exporting its crisis to 
the region. This has turned Russia into a credible and stable alternative (Petrillo, 2013). The 
economic investment of Russia in the region may still be dwarfed by that of the EU, 4,5% 
compared to 89,46%, levels are reached which haven’t been seen since the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. The Serbian population even ‘believe Russia to be the largest supplier of 
development aid to Serbia’ (Szpala, 2014, pp. 3) (London School of Economics, 2015 & Szpala, 
2014). An obstacle to Russian investment in the Balkans and especially in BiH is the bureaucracy of 
both administrations. Investors in the 90’s from Russia were relatively free and stimulated by the 
Western disinterest in the region, nowadays they need approval from the Kremlin before moving 
ahead. This combined with the region not showing disinterest in the West and looking for 
diversification for trade and investments Russia finds itself in the company of strong competitors 
like China and Turkey. Russia favours financial investment and coercion as tools for increasing 
influence, as it believes intimidation will force your opponents to comply (London School of 
Economics, 2015). The utilisation of its gas and energy monopoly is a good example of this tool. 
As mentioned above the Russian government is highly effective in using its shared culture and 
history to increase its popularity amongst the Serbs. 67,5% in Serbia prefer a relationship with 
Russia and only 53,7%, which are mainly elderly, with the EU. Serbian elites from BiH support the 
relationship with Russia, not because they particularly like it, but perceive it as a better option than 
the EU. A relationship with the latter would force rules and regulations which would be bad for their 
enterprises (Szpala, 2014). During the elections in BiH of 2014 Russia send 120 Cossacks as a sign 
of its relationship. They were to take part in cultural celebrations. However, they were not very 
good and not all participated. The BiH intelligence service identified the group as an active military 
unit in the Ukraine. Some argued that the group was to ensure Dodiks safety if the results of the 
elections were not in his favour. After a week the Cossacks left, leaving behind only speculation 
about the true nature of their visit (Borger, 2014). Russia is very able to use perception as a tool. For 
instance; even though of the five military exercises of Serbia four are with Western powers and only 
one with Russia and its allies. Media only reports on the latter instead of the former. It is also able to 
use its shared culture and history to great effect. Not to forget the role of the Serbian Orthodox 
church. The latter may seem less active than Turkey with its Islamic connection, it utilises and 
works through existing relationships build over the past centuries (Anonymous, 2017). 
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From this analysis in previous question it can be argued that Russia believes to have considerable 
influence and uses it to pursue and progress its objectives. It believes the shared Slav history and 
culture, its monopoly on energy and gas and being a stable financial ally with international 
influence as sources of influence as these are often used. It is also able to exploit the failing Western 
institutions combined with dissatisfaction among the population and its shared feeling as victims of 
the West. Russia uses several tools and when it observes too little result or a threat from stronger 
opponents its shifts it attention and aims towards new actors. It has been able to actively change the 
course of action, which can be observed in the RS and within BiH. Damaging and reducing the 
influence of international actors, organisations and institutions. The actual impact of Russia’s 
influence can be observed in the support for Dodik, preventing constitutional reform. An even larger 
impact can be observed from its actions in the UNSC and with the Cossacks present in the RS at 
election time. NATO’s decision to reject BiH’s bid for active membership, also shows the 
international impact of its influence. Most notably is the successful damaging of the image of the 
EU and other Western organisations and institutions. 
5. Does the actor believe in chance or in interconnectedness even where there is none? 
As stated before Russia believes that the strategies of the West are to remain at the centre of 
international political power. Deriving from this the Russian government may believe there is 
interconnectedness amongst all actions by international organisations and institutions to hamper and 
frustrate Russian policy and influence in the region. For instance in 2015 Russia condemned the 
USA for sanctioning Dodik believing it was doing so to hide its own failures within BiH (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2017). It also condemned the biased 
reporting of BiH journalists on the motivations of Russia to veto the Srebrenica resolution (The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2015 & Nougayrede, 2015). Furthermore it 
agrees with the stance of the RS that the Serbs are treated unequally by the international community 
(The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2015).  
The deterministic belief of Russia, its believe to have considerable influence over the course of 
action combined with, in its own words, its constant and predictable foreign policies give rise to the 
reasoning that it rejects the possibility of accidents or chance influencing the flow of political 
events. Russia doesn't muddle through but adjusts its course according to the development of the 
situation. The relationship with Serbia, shifting its attention to the RS, using the dissatisfaction with 
Western powers and the monopoly are but a few examples of this. It has also altered its position on 
financial and military material support. 
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George argues when an actor doesn’t muddle through it believes in right wrong decisions. In 
Russia’s case this would mean that by losing Serbia, the RS or the support of the Serbian people it 
may lose the possibility to create a unified Serbian nation. Such developments in turn could lead to 
integration of the Balkans into NATO and the EU which Russia believes would threaten its security. 
The government also believes such a development would decrease domestic legitimacy and possible 
survival of the regime in Russia. This line of reasoning is supported by several scholars as 
mentioned before. 
Instrumental questions 
1. How are goals set and selected for political action? 
In answering this question we need to consider the observations made in the 'Weltanschauung' 
questions three and four. Russia has a combination of deterministic and indeterministic beliefs, it 
has an active attitude and seizes and creates opportunities while using different tools to obtain its 
objectives. Here we must not forget its single path of a unified Serbian nation as its best bet against 
NATO and EU enlargement. Russia believes to have considerable influence over the course of 
action and in its ability to pursue its objectives. Furthermore we can observe a careful and gradual 
deployment of its means and pursuit of its objectives. In 2010 it favoured, supported by the EU, to 
phase out the OHR and preferred the RS to establish a dialogue instead of provoking tensions by a 
referendum. This stance found little resistance amongst its opponents, leading Russia to move on to 
a bolder position. It started to support Dodik politically in the international community and 
opposing the influence of, and emphasising the failure by Western institutions and organisations 
within BiH. It did not yet directly support Dodik or the RS financially. The latter had looked at 
Russia for such support but was unable to agree with the set demands. It then moved on to abstain 
from the vote in the UN Security Council concerning the extension of EUFOR. Later on Russia 
vetoed the resolution on Srebrenica. Meanwhile it sent Cossack troops during the elections of 2014. 
It then condemned the USA for its sanctions. At this point Russia enjoyed high approval rates 
amongst the Serbian population and Dodik was able to secure a deal for financial support to close 
the budget of the RS. Russia repaid its Soviet debt to BiH of which 33% would go to the RS, 
indirectly filling Dodik’s coffers. During these developments it has also been able to foster its 
relationship with Serbia via financial support and more recently by supplying military equipment. 
Over time Russia exploited its shared Slavic culture and history to promote its view of international 
affairs amongst the Serbian population, both in BiH and Serbia. This has led the Serbian population 
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to perceive Russia as a stable economic power with international influence and its main supplier of 
aid and investment. 
From this analysis we can conclude that Russia deploys an optimising strategy in which it 
gradually deploys limited means to meet its objectives. Separately they deliver a low, but combined 
a maximum payoff. By deploying different means to influence the course of action it can be 
concluded that Russia considers itself not to be all knowing and unable to oversee all consequences 
of its actions. On this latter statement a note has to be made concerning the development of its 
relationship with Serbia. Russia lashed out to Serbia by stating it should know which relationship to 
prioritise, which leads us to consider that Russia may believe to have considerable oversight over 
the consequences of its actions. This careful deployment of means also indicates Russia prefers to 
avoid adventures and seriously considers the strength of its opponents and the likelihood and ability 
to be deployed. 
2. How does the actor pursue his goals? 
In line with its strategy for selecting goals Russia gradually pursues its objectives, it explores its 
possibilities and looks for opportunities to utilise. In this strategy it also ensures to be on top in 
order to retreat when a situation might escalate. For evidence we can, again, look at the evolving 
relationship with the RS, Serbia and the Serbian population in both states over time. Russia prefers 
to provoke its opponents after it believes to be in control of the situation through careful calculation 
of risks and exploration of possible reactions in earlier stages. When it provokes, Russia is sure to 
be able to take necessary steps to prevent full escalation of the situation. This can be observed from 
its financial support to the RS. At first it set demands which the RS either was unable to meet or if 
the RS agreed wouldn’t seem to be more appealing than those of independent international 
financiers. When it did secure financial support for the RS it was indirectly: a Russian business in 
Florida and the repayment of the Soviet dept. The latter would benefit all parties in BiH, meanwhile 
indirectly financing Dodik and the RS. Via this strategy it could still claim the action would benefit 
all ethnic groups if it would be criticised. The military supplies for Serbia can be explained along 
the same line of reasoning. If criticised by international powers Russia can claim the USA is 
supplying Croatia with military equipment and that Russia is Serbia’s logical trading partner as it 
has a trade agreement as is its historical and present ally.  
When trying to trace Russian steps of influence indicators and evidence seem obvious. However, 
an actual trace is hard to establish as Russia often moves via alleged partners and actions which can 
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be interpreted differently. On the other hand Russian influence and opinion is very clear, for 
instance in the Kosovo case (Anonymous, 2017). 
3. ‘How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?’ (George, 1969, 
pp. 212) 
As has been explained in the previous questions Russia deploys its means gradually, which gives 
it a control over the possible risks following its actions. It limits its means in order to pursue its 
objectives. For instance its main focus is on deploying its international influence, its shared Slavic 
culture and history. But also on its political and limited financial support and discrediting Western 
institutions and organisations. Compared to Turkey or other international actors, these are limited 
means. Russia creates the illusion to provoke and is willing to risk while at the same time being 
fully aware of all possible steps that may help to avoid actual escalation. An example of this 
strategy is abstaining from the vote for the extension of EUFOR. But also vetoing the Srebrenica 
resolution, and most notably by supporting Dodiks bid for secession and Serbia’s claim against 
Kosovo’s independence. Meanwhile it condemns Western institutions and organisations. Its 
relationship with Serbia is prove that it is able to make miscalculations, but also to learn from these 
mistakes. In response to such an event Russia is able to alter its strategy and deploy its available 
means in a different way to reach its objectives. In line with this kind of operational code it 
strategically avoids situations in which it has no control or expects opponents to be stronger. 
4. Does the actor seize opportunities to pursue its goals? 
As discussed in the first and second instrumental question Russia seizes those opportunities 
which it believes to progress its objectives, provoking opponents if necessary. At the same time it 
believes to be in control of the steps to avoid, and able to delay situations that may lead, to full 
escalation. Situations that can be considered here are the actions in the UN Security Council. The 
financial and political support to the RS and Serbia at a time when international organisations 
blocked budgets or demanded political reform and the EU was suffering from its financial crisis. 
The support in military equipment to Serbia. And the ability to use the failing Western institutions 
and organisations and lack of EU enlargement policy to bolster its image as a stable economic 
power with international influence. 
5. How are the means available best used by the actor in the situation at hand, while pursuing 
his goals? 
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Russia effectively uses the appropriate means in different situations, it is able to do so by 
limiting the means it uses and carefully exploring and controlling the situation at hand. For evidence 
we can look again at the developments around the financial situation in both Serbia and the RS. 
However, Serbia is a case in point where the chosen means did not realise full payoff. Russia relied 
on its shared Slavic culture and history, its free trade agreement, the monopoly on gas and the 
feeling of victimisation by the West to tip the balance in its favour. Serbia, on the other hand, 
preferred to balance its relationships between the West and Russia, despite the populations 
preference for a relationship with Russia. It was fully aware of the fact that Russia would not be 
able to supply all necessary economic, political and military advantages that other relationships 
could. In response Russia lashed out and adjusted its strategy sending financial support, displaying 
its international influence in matters such as the resolution on Srebrenica and support against 
Kosovo’s secession, and eventually offering military equipment.  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7. Discussion 
From the above analysis we can conclude that the operational code of Turkey concerning BiH is 
based on beliefs which have evolved over the period discussed in this study. From 2009 onward it 
believed BiH to be harmonious. Conflict might be possible due to misinterpretations of situations 
by ethnic groups. Optimism in goal realisation was allowed while being aware of limitations of the 
means used and the actor itself. As Turkey actively seizes opportunities it believes the future is 
indeterministic. Outcomes are considered to be relatively predictable. It is therefore possible to have 
considerable control over events via its tools of influence. An optimising strategy is deployed. In it 
many different objectives are pursued, with different levels of payoff. Opportunities that may help 
to progress these goals are actively seized. In pursuing the goals consideration is given to the 
strength of opponents to avoid escalation. It is probable that risk is calculated and controlled but 
with little effect or accuracy. This has produced a reactive strategy in which opportunities are 
seized. All available means are deployed to progress and obtain objectives.  
In the period after the coup, Turkey’s operational code may have started to evolve towards a 
belief that BiH could be conflictual. Turkey may believe it is the aim of local ethnic groups and the 
international system to drive Islam out of BiH and the Balkan. The successes of the past, such as the 
Istanbul summit and reconstruction of Muslim monuments, has led to an optimistic believe in 
reaching goals. This optimism in turn has led to a deterministic approach towards outcomes. In 
contrast to a deterministic approach Turkey still actively engages in opportunities, which is an 
indicator for an indeterministic approach. Actions by other actors are perceived as interconnected 
and little consideration is given to the influence of chance. Therefore Turkey may believe to be able 
to control situations and find risk calculation unnecessary. It sets goals with high payoff and pursues 
these actively by seizing opportunities. When seizing such opportunities it uses the appropriate 
means to progress. 
Russia’s believed BiH to be harmonious. Conflict might be possible, but in contrast to Turkey, it 
believes international institutions and organisations, such as NATO, the OHR and the EU, as the 
source of it. Its optimism is dependent on the successes in achieving goals. Outcomes are 
predictable concerning those events in which it can exercise influence with the available tools. 
Russia believes chance to have little ability to influence the course of actions. Objectives with 
different levels of payoff are selected to gradually progress towards goals with maximum payoff. In 
pursuit of objectives, careful consideration is given to the strengths of opponents and the likelihood 
and ability to deploy it in the situation at hand. Risks are controlled and calculated by limiting the 
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means, exploring situations, and careful provocation of opponents. Opportunities where deployment 
of the available means is appropriate should be seized. Provocation is allowed when there is control 
to prevent full escalation. 
With these operational codes in hand we can look at the development of BiH and observe what 
the influence of these actors has been. After the general elections of 2010 Zlatko Lagumdžija found 
himself voted out by the Bosniaks. His party focussed on economic development and downplaying 
nationalism. Meanwhile he threatened the RS with physical force if it were to proceed with its bid 
for secession not denying the possibility of war. In that same election other politicians whom 
directly engaged Dodik got little public support. This shows the willingness of the Bosniaks to 
come to a compromise (Latal, 2010). At that same time we can observe the diplomatic engagement 
of Turkey with BiH and its neighbours through the trilateral meetings between BiH - Serbia - 
Turkey and BiH - Croatia - Turkey. Turkey promotes its open diplomatic stance in which it seeks 
contact with all parties, despite their believes. It aims to cooperate to work towards stability and 
peace in the region and economic growth. This engagement of Turkey ensured the acceptance of a 
resolution on Srebrenica by the Serbian parliament. Apologies were made by the governments of 
Serbia and Croatia for atrocities committed during the war. Turkey was able to pick up where the 
Butnik talks had failed. It enjoyed the preference from all parties involved to work towards 
constitutional reform and peace and stability in the region. Through several summits it was able to 
reach agreements amongst the three different ethnic groups; to commit to reform, cooperation 
towards EU accession, economic development, reconciliation and bringing war criminals to trial. 
Down the line academics, domestic, regional and international politicians and organisations started 
to criticise Turkey. It was focussed on the financial and political support towards mainly Muslim 
communities. Important actors from the Turkish government were perceived to make religious-
cultural motivated statements. The actions and policies became oriented against certain EU 
members and policies. During this time it tried to establishing itself as a competitor to other 
international powers in the region. This deterministic view and focus with little consideration of its 
limitations, impact on and strength of its opponents led to harsher reactions. Serbia went to state 
that it perceived Turkey to be an important ally, but did not want to fall under Ottoman rule again. 
Dodik used the statements and actions to strengthen the image of an expansionistic Turkey reviving 
the Ottoman empire, threatening the Serbian population which had suffered under the Ottoman 
regime in the past. Exporting its culture combined with financial, educational and international 
support led to approval amongst the Muslim dominated countries. This also gave opponents more 
reason to believe in a hidden expansionist and Ottoman agenda. Moving forward, Turkey started to 
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support nationalistic political leaders who look favourably to Turkey and opposed the EU and other 
Western institutions and organisations within BiH. Secession of RS would be perceived by 
Bosniaks as Serbians winning the war of the 90’s after all. This perspective led politicians to state 
that the existence of the RS is guaranteed by the Dayton Accords. They went on to say Secessionist 
actions would not go down well with the Federation. The reactions of Bosniaks concerning the 
recent developments within Turkey and its role in the international community show the strong ties 
with Turkey. Turkey observes its increasing success of exerting influence on Bosniak politicians 
from their willingness to close down Gülen facilities in Bosniak constituencies and support for 
Turkeys pronouncements against the EU. Turkeys operational code has given the other ethnic 
groups and political leaders reasonn to believe that Turkey wants to destabilise the fragile situation 
in BiH and further entrench the ethnic divide. 
The Serb leader Dodik has found several tools to gain support and votes for his party in 
upcoming elections. The most notable of these tools are the tensions around BiH’s history, the little 
reconciliation after the last war, and the disappointment in, and disapproval of Western actors, 
institutions and organisations. The RS started to challenges the international and domestic 
institutions of BiH via rhetoric, referenda and blocking policies or reform. Early on Russia showed 
minimal support for the RS by stating it would prefer to see a dialogue between all actors but agrees 
with the entity that other actors make this impossible. In line with other international powers it 
voiced preference for phasing out the OHR. This would allow the true representation of all the 
Bosnian people to take control over its country. Earlier on Russia had already been able to establish 
a monopoly on gas and energy supply. It established a strong relationship with Serbia by promoting 
its shared Slavic culture and history. It saw a chance to gain allies to oppose the expansion of the 
EU and NATO. Russia believed this would lead to increased legitimacy at home and survival of its 
regime. It would also be revenge for being ignored during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. 
However Serbia proved to have a mind of its own. It favoured to balance its relationship between 
the Western powers, Turkey and Russia, preferring stabilisation and economic growth in the region. 
This forced Russia to reconsider its strategy, not with standing its deterministic views. Russia 
followed its views on the use of limited means to prevent escalation and retain control over 
situations in which it was involved. It kept its focus on the Serbian population. It moved its 
attention towards the RS in which it found support for its stance against the Western powers, 
institutions and organisations. While the EU was involved in its financial crisis and showed little 
interest in its enlargement policies in the Balkans, and when funds for the RS were blocked by the 
International Monetary Fund, the RS turned to Russia for financial support. Russia replied with 
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demanding commercial rates for loans and influence in public companies. This strategy might serve 
to explore international reactions to avoid escalation. Russia’s political support for Dodik was 
criticised but with the attention of Western powers drawn towards the Middle East, Russia found 
minimal threats to its objectives in the Balkans. At this time it voiced its commitment to the 
international rule of law, respect for sovereign states and support for the Dayton Accords. It 
believed that in following this line it could not support the OHR. It abstained from the vote on the 
extension of EUFOR in the UN Security Council. By this action it wanted to show it could disrupt 
the stability of the region if Russia would wish to do so. The criticism of the Western powers on 
Dodik and Russia worked to its advantage by promoting the Russian view of international affairs 
and regional history, opposing the Western powers, institutions and organisations. Meanwhile 
portraying itself as a stable economic ally with international influence. Russia was able to do so via 
its shared Slavic culture and history. Financial problems and international support for Kosovo’s 
independence drove Serbia back towards Russia. The latter adjusted its strategy and offered 
political and financial support to Serbia. It also secured financial support to the RS via a Russian 
investors based in Florida and by repaying its Soviet debt to BiH. Meanwhile Russia vetoed the 
resolution on Srebrenica by the United Kingdom in the UN Security Council claiming it was anti-
Serb.  
Russia’s support to the RS and the Serbian people has led Dodik to more boldly oppose the 
Western institutions and organisations. As a result any constitutional reform that doesn’t include 
more independence for the RS has been halted. Over time Dodik has often threatened to hold a 
referendum but always refrained, under international pressure, from actually doing so at the last 
moment. With the support of Russia Dodik pushed through its referendum on ‘Statehood Day’ 
causing domestic disturbances. The referendum was perceived as in defiance of the constitutional 
court and the Dayton Agreements, further entrenching the ethnic differences amongst the population 
of BiH.  
The operational code and involvement of both Turkey and Russia over time has led to 
destabilisation in the region. Nationalism is strengthened and is making constitutional reform and 
political consensus practically impossible. However, Turkeys orientation has been more in line with 
that of the Western powers and worked towards NATO integration. Recent developments may lead 
us to think of a changing attitude. Russia has been most effective in the region by using limited 
means. Its ability to shape the perception of situations at hand to its favour, for example with the 
military exercises, can be considered as one of its strongest tools. Compared to Russia Turkey has 
deployed a wide range of soft power tools to progress its goals and objectives. 
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Limitations 
As with any other study, this research has limitations with have to be considered. ‘Those 
interested in the beliefs of decision-makers have no yearbook to which they can turn for comparable 
evidence’ (Holsti, 1976, pp. 21).  Holsti points out one of the limitations of this qualitative study; 
the data found are hard to quantify or to present in such a way that is comparable to other cases, 
‘(u)nlike figures on budgets, trade or voting, each data set developed for a cognitive process study is 
likely to be used only once’ (Holsti, 1976, pp. 21). However, this research comes with more 
limitations than just those of the research method. As mentioned before, the units of analysis in this 
study are not the only actors who influence the flow of events in BiH. Nor are the events and 
outcomes they have produced the only ones to consider when looking at the situation. For instance, 
Clark questioned if religious actors were doing enough to progress reconciliation in BiH. The study 
concluded that religious actors had great influence over their congregation. Instead of leading by 
example and accepting the past, they doubt the rulings of the ICTY and preach different versions of 
history. As religion is closely connected to the different ethnic groups in BiH, religious leaders can 
make a difference by reaching out and stimulate reconciliation (2010). Another important actor 
within BiH is the OHR. The office was established to ensure the implementation of the Dayton 
Accords. It acquired considerable influential tools over time. In the light of international criticism 
and hoping to force the political leadership of BiH to move forward to constitutional reform, it took 
a more passive stance. Following this development the political leadership became more 
nationalistic and entrenchment along ethnic lines increased. Meanwhile the population doesn't seem 
to be able to hold the leadership to account. These are but two examples of other actors and events 
that may have had a strong impact on the flow of events in BiH. Other actors or developments 
which could be considered in a study could be the nationalistic party leadership, the effect of the 
disinterest and weak enlargement policies of the EU, the change of leadership in the USA, the 
impact of the financial crisis. History might be the most interesting influence on BiH to consider in 
a new research. 
The units of analysis are not the only limitations to this study, so is the chosen period. By 
selecting a certain period, events and actions happening before it have been left out of the analysis. 
As has become clear during the study, influence by Turkey and Russia did not just originate with 
their change in foreign policy or their renewed interest in the area. Their position in history towards 
the development of BiH is of considerable influence. Both use their history, heritage and culture as 
sources of influence. 
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By researching the operational code a study is done on the belief systems of several actors within 
the administrations of Turkey and Russia. It is, however, impossible to obtain certainty about what 
the actors’ beliefs are. Even if we would be able to interview members of staff and high ranking 
political figures it is questionable if they give us truthful information. The operational code is no 
hard evidence about the beliefs of these actors. Nor is it a concrete formula which can accurately 
predict how they will act in future events and how they may influence the development of BiH. 
With all its limitations this research does give us an interesting insight in how both actors 
believe, and in some case have been able to influence the development of BiH. It is a detailed study 
of the reported involvement of each actor in the flow of events. This can provide us with a deeper 
understanding of their interest in BiH. Based on the approach of this study the operational codes of 
other actors in BiH can be analysed and established. Such a detailed analysis will give us a better 
understanding of how events evolved the way they have. Such a study can provide us with a better 
understanding on how to support and guide BiH towards an effective constitutional design, better 
understanding amongst its ethnic groups, and its economic and democratic development. It would 
give insights into the design of the Dayton Accords and the development of its implementation. This 
would enable the international community to design tailored peace agreements for other domestic 
conflicts in the world where ethnicity and religion play an important role. There are many more 
valuable lessons which can be learned from BiH. This study can provide valuable information for 
dealing with these actors in situations in the Middle East and other hot spots. The data found can be 
used, supplemented with data and analysis from other cases, to estimate the operational codes for 
each actor outside BiH.  
H.B. van den Berg Leiden University !58
8. A few last questions 
During this study a few question have arisen which I would like to have answered but have been 
unable to do without complete and in-depth research. In this chapter I will attempt to answer these 
questions based on the found data, the analysis and the interview I have conducted with experts who 
wish to remain anonymous in the light of their positions. It is my hope that these questions may 
inspire further research. I aim here to provide future researchers a humble basis to spark their 
interest in more solid studies to advance the development of peace building strategies. 
Is secession by the RS likely?  
This question arose due to the turmoil surrounding the referendum on statehood day by the RS. 
First of all we have to see the bid for secession in perspective. This isn’t the first time Dodik has 
ushered the threat of a referendum or secession. He has been working on such referenda for the past 
10 years (van der Steen, 2016). This rhetoric has delivered him several victories. Which is of 
importance as his support has diminished. The real bid for secession has always been a threat and 
nothing more, in search of more support and votes. In this light we should also consider the 
economic strength of the entity. Secession would not solve its problems and the economic 
conditions will not guarantee long survival.  
The RS can be considered as one of the major obstacles in BiH to work towards constitutional 
reform. But so are the Federation, Parliament and Presidency. The Serbs are able to use the 
constitutional design, to block legislation at the central level of government. However, they apply 
such legislation later on, in the RS, on entity level. On the other hand the increasingly dissatisfied 
Croats, but also the Bosniaks, hamper solutions of several important issues, such as taxes, at the 
central level. Meanwhile Croats and Serbs find each other in their desire for more autonomy from 
the central government. Only the Bosniaks aim at a more centralised state. The former leads to a 
fear amongst the latter for disintegration of BiH along ethnic lines. The actions of the RS, which 
block the building of a motorway, their refusal of Sarajevo postal stamps, and swaps of trains 
coming from the federation, do not help the increasingly tense situation. (Morrison, 2010, Traynor, 
2011 & Vulliamy, 2011). 
This study has found evidence for political and limited financial support of Russia to the RS. 
Secession of the RS, however, would not be in Russia’s best interest. The entity would rely mainly 
on Russia for financial support and investment. Russia is probably unwilling and unable to deliver 
such support and investment to the entity, as the RS has no real economic viability. The possibility 
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of physical conflict, however minimal, would put a further strain on the Russian resources. As these 
are already deeply engaged in the Ukraine, Syria and other hotspots in the world. Secession would 
be precisely the kind of escalation Russia is trying to control, and prevent from happening. 
Therefore I deem actual secession of the RS improbable but not impossible. The constitutional 
design provided by the Dayton Accords has established a dysfunctional political system in BiH 
which simply cannot survive. I believe that we will see a transformation and change in the 
constitutional and perhaps even territorial design of BiH, however I strongly doubt this will be 
anytime soon.  
Is renewed armed conflict within BiH likely?  
Statements from both sides have become more provocative towards each other, which is 
precisely their purpose. By provoking other ethnic parties to make bold statements, either side can 
bolster its ethno-nationalistic orientation and secure a few more votes. These developments should 
not be taken lightly as the RS has threatened the international forces, claiming its police force is 
larger. The Bosniaks, in turn, have emphasised a secession would be perceived as a delayed victory 
of the Serbs and would not go down well with the Bosniak population. The Bosniak leadership even 
went as far as to state it believes war is not unthinkable. Such rising tensions have led Serbia to state 
it respects BiH but would not let anything happen to the RS. Feeling strengthened by Serbia and 
Russia, Dodik went on to state that if the Bosniaks were to march on the RS it would declare 
independence and defend itself (Knezevic, 2016, McLaughlin, 2016, Mujanovic, 2016 & Latal, 
2010). When the international community condemned the referendum held by Dodik they played 
right into his hands. All sides in the crisis benefited from the upheaval caused by the issue and the 
international reactions. Ethno-national oriented parties were able to secure votes municipal 
elections. This enabled the political leadership to focus on ethnical and historical issues, instead of 
health care, unemployment, educational, economic and constitutional reform (Delaney, 2016 & The 
Economist, 2016). The hands-off approach of the OHR has given more space for Dodiks secession 
rhetorics and challenging Western powers, institutions and organisations (Delaney, 2016). 
A case in point, which shows the deteriorating situation in BiH, is Mostar, a city in the South-
eastern part of the Federation. Here schools, hospitals and other public services are carefully 
separated between Bosniaks and Croats to prevent integration (Boulter, 2012). Another worrisome 
development is Srebrenica. For the first time since the war a Serbian mayor has been chosen. The 
election and his denial of atrocities has led to aggression and violence amongst local ethnic groups 
(Guardian, 2016 & Mujanovic, 2016). These developments show BiHs population is unable to come 
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to terms with their past. This in turn prevents integration and understanding amongst ethnic groups. 
In my study I have touched on the subject of Turkey and the Gülen movement developing 
educational facilities and focussing on restoring the Muslim and Ottoman heritage. However well 
intended, such developments give strength to arguments claiming there is a Muslim threat on their 
doorstep.  
Behind this grim cloud, there is a silver lining. Local politicians state that the population is 
smarter than to be influenced by such rhetorics. Veterans of the Federation organise fund raisers and 
collect money to support their fellow veterans from the RS. The latter do not receive any pension 
after they were forced to retire in the aftermath of the war. Young people are known to participate in 
the political debate and give rise to multi-ethnic parties. However, such parties soon disappear due 
to the design of the Dayton Accords. It should not be forgotten that BiH is working towards NATO 
membership and has made considerable progress towards it. Along this line it has also produced a 
formal EU candidacy application (Borger, 2012, Delaney, 2016, European Students Forum, 2016 & 
Mujanovic, 2016). As has been discussed in this study, the Serbian and Croatian presidents have 
apologised for the atrocities committed during the war. Also, both countries have signed agreements 
with BiH and Turkey to cooperate towards several goals. 
I believe it isn’t in the best interest of any of the international powers active within BiH to have a 
renewed conflict. Turkey, Russia, the USA and the EU are already highly strained by ongoing 
conflicts in Syria and the aftermath of the Arab Spring. A destabilisation of BiH or the Balkans 
would seriously hamper the economic development of Turkey. It would also put conflict right on the 
doorstep of the EU. However, these same international actors should understand that by steering up 
ethnic rhetoric and division, and by focussing their support on certain ethnic groups, discontent can 
develop to such a level that it will spill over into physical conflict. However much control all 
international actors may believe to have over political events in BiH and its the political leadership, 
emotions amongst the grass roots run deep. As neither Turkey nor Russia are currently in a position 
where they can handle another conflict, it would be wise to reconsider the impact of their strategies 
and recalculate the risks of their actions and policies. 
Have there been actions for reconciliation?  
In the years following the war of the early 90’s the International Crisis Group reported that 
‘(i)nternational agencies seemed resigned to failure almost as soon as they arrived’ (2014, pp. 1). 
With some waiting out their time, doing the minimum required, counting the days to their own 
departure. While others reported extraordinary efforts had to be made to reach even the minimum of 
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results (International Crisis Group, 2014). No one in BiH is willing to take the first step, and 
responsibility for their warcrimes, nor support to any reconciliation. Truth commissions are known 
to fail and religious leaders carry on with promoting their preferred version of history (Bancroft, 
2010 & Vulliamy, 2011). While the ICTY is charged with prosecution of the main orchestrators of 
wartime atrocities, the local courts are burdened with the trials of local war criminals. The lack of 
transparency and the burden of the many cases increase the feeling that justice is lacking (McRobie, 
2010). Srebrenica is a case in point when it comes to an increasing feeling of lack of justice and 
little effect on reconciliation. Mothers of Srebrenica filed a law suit against the UN for failing to 
protect the safe area. The UN, however, is immune to prosecution. It has admitted its failure but is 
unwilling to do so before the courts. This is a prime example of the failure to hold the international 
community responsible for its actions. Which seriously halts reconciliation and establishing a 
complete picture of history (McRobie, 2010). I have also touched upon the research by Clark into 
the actions of religious actors for progressing reconciliation. It shows that these actors have done 
very little to advance reconciliation and integration. It may even be argued that these actors prefer 
further entrenchment along ethnic lines. Clark doubts if the religious leaders within BiH want peace 
and stability (2010). 
I believe that attempts have been made for reconciliation and that these, over time, have been 
relatively successful. We can see a BiH more at peace than it has been in the past thirty years. 
However, the unwillingness of international actors to take responsibility for their actions during the 
war seriously hampers the establishment of a complete and relatively correct story of history. This, 
and more developments and unwillingness amongst political and religious actors, prevents the 
population of BiH to move forward and make peace with their troubled past. 
What may we possibly learn from BiH for new conflict resolutions and 
peace building strategies in the future?  
Amongst the many lessons to be learned a few which I have discovered in this study are; 1) the 
international community often emphasises that despite a persons religion all people are equal. Equal 
in the sense that we are all human beings. Despite the religion of another person, he or she is as 
much a person with the right to a life as anyone else. However, by emphasising this equality ethnic 
conflicts become more severe. On the other hand by acknowledging the differences in religions 
groups can be motivated towards understanding and respect. The identity of an individual can be 
closely connected to that of a group, community or country. This creates a “we” feeling in which 
others feel the pain and suffering brought upon someone with the same identity. Religion, ethnicity, 
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culture and nationality play an important role in establishing such an identity and bringing together 
a group of people (van den Berg, 2016). 
2) Dayton has been able to broker a peace deal and halted violence where other attempts failed. 
However, Dayton is a case in point that shows a constitutional design made during such 
negotiations should make clear provision to enable reform when confronted with a political 
deadlock. The Accords also show us the danger of basing a constitution on ethnic groups and 
ostracising other minorities. Although a peace agreement should, first and foremost, aim to end 
violence, it should also establish a solid ground for post war justice or make provision to do so later 
on. It should prevent the establishment of a framework which cannot be changed. BiH shows that 
without proper tools war criminals, whatever their role or influence, can roam without being 
convicted. This causes distrust within social communities and of the judicial system of a country, 
crippling the credibility of the political leadership. 
3) The institutions and international powers engaged in advancing economic and democratic 
development should commit themselves for a considerable duration to the country involved. These 
organisations should establish a clear plan in which they can work towards common goals with the 
local and central government. Deadlines should be set, with considerable possibilities for relative 
extensions. This would help to work towards phasing out the involved international powers, 
institutions and organisations. By establishing such deadlines and by involving domestic 
representation, the population can slowly move towards independence and political ownership. 
During this time they should not only aim to advance democratic policies and organise fair 
elections. They should also educate, motivate and support both the population and the political 
leadership. BiH is a case in point where the population is unable or unwilling to hold their political 
elite responsible for their actions.  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